Key points
- The United States renewed sanctions on Burma in 2012, calling them insurance against backsliding.
- Two decades of pressure had left the military stronger, not weaker, before it handed power to an elected government.
- Sanctions threatened to hurt ordinary people and slow reforms that needed foreign investment.
- Most other countries had moved toward engagement, leaving Washington isolated.
Background
In 2012 the US administration renewed its economic sanctions on Burma. The administration described them as a safeguard in case the reformist government in Naypyidaw slid backwards, while supporters in the US legislature argued that outside pressure had driven the reforms in the first place and was still needed.
An awkward compromise
The policy reflected a split in Washington. The administration had already admitted that earlier sanctions had failed. It wanted to back the Burmese president's ambitious reform programme and to achieve specific goals, such as ending Burma's military links with North Korea, and had made several concessions to that end. But a group of determined lawmakers remained hostile to Burma's mixed civilian and military government and doubted how far it had really changed in the previous year and a half. Facing more pressing battles, the administration chose not to fight them on this.
The evidence did not support the idea that sanctions had produced reform. After some 20 years of US pressure, Burma's armed forces were more secure than ever, which may be part of why they felt able to step back in favour of an elected government in 2011.
The likely costs
Renewed sanctions risked doing harm on several fronts. They would hit ordinary Burmese hardest. They would make it harder to carry out reforms that depended on foreign money, technology and skills. And they would weaken the president and his reformist allies while strengthening conservatives who wanted change to slow down or stop. Sanctions alone would not derail the process, but if it did falter, Washington would share the blame.
What to watch
Burma still had far to go on human rights and had not cut every tie with Pyongyang. Yet the broad international view was that closer engagement and practical help offered the best route to progress. By 2012 the United States was the only country still imposing sanctions, sending a confusing signal to Naypyidaw, to the Burmese public and to the wider region.
Why it matters for Australia
How Burma's reforms fared mattered for stability around the Bay of Bengal and for the wider South-East Asian neighbourhood that Australia trades with. A split between Washington and the rest of the world on engagement also shaped the choices open to the United States' regional partners, Australia among them.
First published in 2012 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
Related from earlier editions
- A New Administration in Washington and What It Meant for Pakistan2021 | Indian Ocean
- After the 2021 Myanmar Coup: Few Good Options for Outside Powers2021 | Indian Ocean
- China deepens its foothold in Djibouti with port money and a carrier-ready pier2021 | Indian Ocean
- Doses and Influence: How China Used Pandemic Vaccines Abroad in 20212021 | Indian Ocean