Key points
- China pledged vaccines to more than 80 mostly developing countries from late 2020.
- Most recipients paid for their doses, some using Chinese loans, and nearly all were partners in China's overseas infrastructure programme.
- Doubts over trial data and effectiveness persisted until a global health body cleared one Chinese vaccine for emergency use.
- Western vaccine pledges in mid-2021 set up a contest for influence in the same regions.
Background
By early 2021, as the first COVID-19 vaccines rolled out, global demand far outstripped supply. Production capacity and raw materials were both short. China, widely blamed as the likely source of the pandemic and criticised for its slow disclosure of the early outbreak, saw an opening. From late 2020 it offered its own doses to over 80 nations, presenting itself as a provider of solutions rather than the origin of the crisis. Beijing framed this as health co-operation along its overseas development routes.
Who got the vaccines
The reach was wide. Chinese doses went to countries in India's neighbourhood, across Africa, Latin America, the Pacific, and Central, Western and South-East Asia, with more deals signed. By June 2021 China said it had supplied more than 350 million doses abroad. Among its South-East Asian neighbours it funded purchases for some poorer states and sold to wealthier ones. In South Asia it competed with India, whose vaccines were often preferred, until India halted exports to meet its own needs. Several Central and Eastern European states also sought Chinese supplies, while Western Europe largely did not.
Only a few countries received doses as gifts. Most paid, sometimes with Chinese loans. One analysis found that of the 56 countries pledged doses in early 2021, 55 were participants in China's large overseas infrastructure programme. Critics saw this as a way to keep those governments supportive of Chinese projects on their soil. China also left out the United States, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, which had their own supply or allies to draw on.
Production and credibility
Chinese drug makers were more willing than Western firms to license local production. Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Brazil all moved to manufacture or fill Chinese vaccines, though Brazil's output stalled in 2021 when raw material shipments from China were interrupted. At home, China kept its pharmaceutical sector under strong state influence and did not plan to make foreign-designed vaccines, partly out of national pride.
The biggest weakness was trust. Clinical trial data had not been fully released, and in April 2021 the head of China's disease control agency acknowledged that efficacy was low and that mixing vaccines was under consideration. A turning point came in May 2021, when a global health body approved one Chinese vaccine for emergency use after reviewing data and inspecting the factory. That opened the way for it to be supplied through a global scheme offering free doses to poorer countries. China also pledged billions of dollars in extra aid to developing countries and proposed a global vaccine forum.
What to watch
The vaccine push bought China goodwill in parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa, many of which already relied on it for aid and infrastructure, though often at the cost of further debt. In mid-2021 the United States pledged to share tens of millions of doses, and it joined Australia, India and Japan in a plan to deliver a large supply of a Western-made vaccine across Asia within about eighteen months. The open question was how far these would displace Chinese supply in markets Beijing had already entered, as international scrutiny of the virus's origins intensified.
Why it matters for Australia
Australia joined partners in a plan to supply vaccines to Asian countries, partly to balance China's growing health diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese influence built through vaccines and loans across the Pacific and South-East Asia bears on Australia's own regional relationships.
First published in 2021 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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