Key points
- Foreign governments split along familiar lines after the February 2021 takeover, from firm condemnation to calls for calm.
- Past approaches to Myanmar fall roughly into idealist, realist and pragmatist camps, each with clear limits.
- The nationalist outlook of the country's military leaders shapes how any outside pressure is received.
- No mix of responses was likely to improve conditions for the people of Myanmar in the near term.
Background
On 1 February 2021 Myanmar's armed forces seized power, declared a year-long state of emergency and handed executive authority to their commander-in-chief. Politicians and activists were detained, among them an Australian adviser to the elected civilian leader. The move overturned a constitution the generals themselves had drafted in 2008, a document that had worked in their favour for about a decade, so many outside observers had judged a takeover unlikely. The military had done the same thing before, in 1958, 1962 and 1988.
International responses at the time of writing followed a predictable pattern. Western democracies condemned the takeover, demanded that the result of the November 2020 election be respected and began weighing or applying penalties, from frozen assets and targeted sanctions to suspended aid and training. China described the events as little more than a reshuffle. Japan and South Korea, with large commercial stakes, urged reconciliation. Several South-East Asian neighbours voiced concern, while others called it a domestic matter. At the world body's main security forum, objections from China, Russia, India and Vietnam watered a draft resolution down to a mild statement that did not even use the word coup.
Three schools of thought
Three decades of foreign policy towards Myanmar can be sorted into three broad camps.
- Idealists stress international law and human rights. They back sanctions, travel bans and arms embargoes, support the democratic movement and exiles, and deny the military the legitimacy it wants. Much of this is symbolic, but it signals what the wider world values.
- Realists argue that such gestures simply bounce off generals who are beyond reach at home and abroad. Some held that the military never meant to allow genuine democracy and that the post-2011 opening was a ruse to win sanctions relief and investment. They also questioned the crowd of foreign peace advisers who arrived in recent years.
- Pragmatists favour patient, long-term engagement. Australia's small defence training programme with the Myanmar military was one example: criticised by rights campaigners, but defended as a way to keep contact with the country's most powerful institution and perhaps nudge its thinking.
The brutal operations against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 cast doubt on such hopes, yet pragmatists take small gains where they can find them.
The military outlook
Any policy needs to reckon with how Myanmar's commanders think. For more than 50 years they have shown an intense nationalism rooted in fear of internal fragmentation and of foreign designs. Officers learn that the military alone have held the nation together and that civilian politicians cannot be trusted. Three national causes, focused on unity and sovereignty, were built into the 2008 charter and still guide military behaviour. Long periods of economic self-sufficiency and strict neutrality reinforced a belief that outsiders cannot understand the country.
Harsh Western sanctions after 1988 did not change the regime's thinking. Instead they arguably hardened it, encouraging military expansion and suspicion of foreign influence. By 2011 Myanmar was stronger than at any point since independence, and the move to a guided democracy was made from strength.
What it meant
Countries such as Australia faced a real dilemma. Voters and principles demanded strong condemnation, but Myanmar has long resisted outside pressure and now enjoyed cover from China, Russia and regional neighbours. With democracy in retreat in many parts of the world, outside powers had limited tools, and whatever they chose was likely to be imperfect.
Why it matters for Australia
Australia had a defence training link with Myanmar's military and an Australian adviser was detained in the takeover, so the coup tested how Canberra balances principle with keeping lines open. The episode also showed how much influence China holds over a country on the Bay of Bengal near Australia's wider region.
First published in 2021 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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