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From an earlier edition

India Steps Up: Growth, Energy Needs and a Bigger Navy

A 2011 look at how India moved from non-alignment toward ties with every major power, and why its energy imports pushed it further into the Indian Ocean.

2011Long readIndian Ocean3 min read

Key points

  • India swapped strict non-alignment for close links with several major powers at once.
  • Poverty, rural hardship and a Maoist insurgency made domestic stability the first test of its rise.
  • Dependence on imported oil turned sea lanes and choke points into a core security concern.
  • Washington backed India's growth as a counterweight to China, while India kept ties with Iran and Russia.

Background: from non-alignment to many partners

For decades after independence in 1947, India kept its distance from both Cold War camps, favoured multilateral forums and rejected military force as a tool of policy. By 2011 that stance had changed shape. New Delhi was building ties with Washington, Moscow, Beijing and the European bloc all at once, presenting itself as a bridge between them rather than a member of any camp. The piece described this as a reworking of the old idea rather than a break from it: balance was still the aim, but now India sought the gains of closeness instead of the safety of distance.

The turn began with the shocks of 1991. The Soviet collapse cost India key markets, the Gulf war sent oil prices up and forced many Indian workers home from the Gulf, and the country faced a severe payments crisis. The government of the day opened the economy, courted the United States and China, and launched an eastward policy toward South-East Asia. Growth then settled at roughly seven per cent a year.

Problems at home

The paper argued that India's outward ambitions rested on fragile ground. Hundreds of millions still lived in poverty, food prices were climbing fast for the rural poor, and most workers remained on the land. Power, rail and irrigation needed heavy investment, and health and schooling lagged. Those gaps fed a Maoist insurgency across central and eastern India that the then prime minister called the country's gravest internal threat. Sustained growth, in this view, came before everything else.

Energy and the sea

Growth required fuel, and India imported most of it. State oil firms were told to buy assets abroad, and New Delhi cultivated suppliers in the Gulf, Central Asia and Iran. Overland pipelines stalled because of poor relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, and Washington pressed India to choose between an Iranian pipeline and American help with civil nuclear power.

India and Iran shared more than oil. They had agreed on trade links, port and rail development, and a north-south freight corridor through Iran to the Caspian and Russia. Both were wary of Sunni militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

With pipelines out of reach, sea lanes mattered most. The Indian Ocean carries close to half of the world's seaborne trade, and its narrow passages at Hormuz, Aden, Suez and Malacca are open to disruption by war, piracy or terrorism. India began to define its security across the whole basin, from the African coast to the South China Sea.

Military build-up and the US link

New Delhi was spending heavily on long-range aircraft, carriers and nuclear submarines, planned a far larger fleet, and set up a naval command in the Andaman Islands, not far from reported Chinese facilities off Burma. Longer-range missiles were also in development, with possible strains on relations with China and the West.

The United States, long aligned with Pakistan, had warmed to India from the 1980s and openly embraced it after the Cold War. A 2004 framework expanded cooperation on civil nuclear power, space and missile defence, and American officials spoke of helping India become a major world power, largely to balance China's weight in Asia.

Why it matters for Australia

India's growing naval reach and its focus on Indian Ocean sea lanes bore directly on Australia's western approaches and its own trade routes. The shift also signalled a larger partner for Canberra in the region, alongside the risk of sharper rivalry with China in shared waters.

First published in 2011 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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