Future Directions Review
Home/Earlier editions/Indian Ocean

From an earlier edition

Bases, Partners and Sea Lanes: America's Security Footprint in the Indian Ocean

How the United States sought to keep its security role in the Indian Ocean in 2016 through a network of bases and closer ties with regional partners, India above all.

2016Long readIndian Ocean4 min read

Key points

  • Tighter budgets pushed the United States to share more of its security burden with partners.
  • Its main concerns were Middle East instability and China's growing naval presence.
  • A spread of bases from the Gulf to the central Indian Ocean let it respond quickly across the region.
  • India, wary of China's moves around its neighbours, was drawing closer to Washington.

Background

By 2016, economic pressures had led the United States to step back from some of the security commitments it had carried since 1945. To stay influential across the Indian Ocean, it looked to partnerships with democracies and other states whose aims matched its own. Its goals there were to protect the trade and energy routes it relied on, to keep enough force nearby to respond to crises around the ocean's rim, and to preserve the naval lead it had held since the Second World War.

Two concerns stood out. The first was conflict and tension among the Middle Eastern states, where Saudi Arabia and other long-time allies were anxious about Iran's nuclear and missile work. The second was China's expanding presence, which Beijing justified as protecting its supply routes but which neither Washington nor New Delhi found fully convincing.

The network of bases

The heaviest concentration of US forces sat in the Persian Gulf, with thousands of troops in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, smaller numbers in Oman, regular training with Jordan, and a renewed presence in Iraq to train local forces against a hard-line militant group. These bases, with their aircraft and carrier facilities, ringed Iran. They had been set up chiefly to secure allied energy supplies and protect US interests, but deep distrust of Iran was enough to keep them open regardless of budget cuts.

Further south, a large US base in Djibouti, home to around four thousand personnel, overlooked the strait leading to the Red Sea and the Suez route. It helped counter piracy alongside French and Japanese forces and kept watch on war in Yemen and unrest in Somalia. China had recently begun building its own base nearby.

In the middle of the ocean, a long-standing facility on Diego Garcia allowed the United States to watch shipping between East Africa and the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, and had supported operations in Afghanistan and Yemen. There was also talk of using Australia's Cocos Islands, which already had a military airstrip, as a joint site. That would give coverage of ships avoiding Malacca by using the Sunda or Lombok straits, a scenario that helped explain China's interest in overland pipelines through Pakistan.

India as a partner

In the shorter term, Washington's closest interest lay in the rivalry between China and India. It already had firm partners in Japan, South Korea and Australia but lacked one in the eastern Indian Ocean. India, with a growing economy and navy, was the natural candidate, even though it rejected any coalition aimed at containing China.

Chinese activity kept pushing New Delhi in that direction. A Chinese submarine visited Colombo twice in 2014, Sri Lanka's heavy debt to China allowed a Chinese port project to resume after a pause, another submarine called at Pakistan in 2015, and Beijing planned to sell Pakistan advanced submarines. India sought US technology for drones, aircraft and carriers, and agreed to share military logistics facilities, with intelligence agreements expected to follow.

What it meant

The arrangement suited both sides. Washington could hand some security responsibility to a capable regional partner, while India gained access to technology and a path to building its own defence industry. Despite its constraints, the United States remained the strongest military and economic power, and its leading position across the Indian Ocean looked set to last for years.

Why it matters for Australia

Australia hosted rotating US forces and its Cocos Islands featured in talk of a future joint air base, placing it inside the American security network in the Indian Ocean. Closer US and Indian co-operation also aligned with Australia's own interest in a stable balance in the region.

First published in 2016 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

Related from earlier editions

More from earlier editions