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Iran's nuclear programme in 2020: the case that it was never purely civilian

A commentary from 2020 arguing that Iran's nuclear, submarine and satellite projects pointed towards weapons, and that its breakout time had shrunk to months.

2020Short analysisIndian Ocean3 min read

Key points

  • Seized documents showed a state effort to build nuclear warheads up to at least 2003.
  • The argument held that Iran's enrichment made little economic sense for civilian power alone.
  • Plans for nuclear submarines and a military satellite were read as cover for weapons-grade enrichment and missile work.
  • One technical estimate put Iran's breakout time at only a few months.

Background

In early 2018 a large cache of secret Iranian nuclear documents was spirited out of Tehran by Israeli intelligence. Over the following two years outside researchers and journalists sifted through it and found evidence that, until at least 2003, Iran had run a coordinated programme across several sites aimed at producing a handful of nuclear warheads. This commentary, written in May 2020, argued that the weapons effort had never really stopped.

The case being made

Several strands of evidence were put forward. The international nuclear watchdog had reopened its inquiry into the possible military side of Iran's work, and Tehran was blocking inspectors from sites linked to the earlier programme, including a warehouse where traces of processed uranium had been found. Iran's insistence on enriching its own uranium was also hard to justify on cost grounds, since fuel for its few reactors could be bought far more cheaply abroad, and its centrifuges broke down at a rate far above what a viable commercial operation could tolerate.

As the civilian story wore thin, Tehran began to speak of defensive uses of nuclear technology. It announced plans for nuclear-powered submarines, which would offer a pretext for enriching uranium to much higher levels. Naval analysts, however, doubted Iran had the industrial capacity to build such vessels. A similar pattern applied to space. In April 2020 Iran's elite military force placed a small reconnaissance satellite in orbit using a rocket whose range resembled that of its existing medium-range missiles. American officials dismissed the space effort as a front for long-range missile development and described the satellite itself as of little practical use.

Iran had also stepped back from several commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal, building more advanced centrifuges, enlarging its stockpile of enriched material and reopening a heavily fortified enrichment site.

What to watch

A technical study using data from early 2020, which allowed for the possibility of a hidden enrichment plant, estimated that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one device within three to five months if it chose to. With its enriched stockpile still growing, that window appeared to be narrowing. Iran denied seeking nuclear weapons and said its programme was for civilian use, and some analysts judged that no decision to build a weapon had been made. The commentary urged firm international pressure and suggested Australia lend diplomatic support to continued sanctions, even during the pandemic.

Why it matters for Australia

A nuclear-armed Iran would reshape security across the Gulf and the western Indian Ocean, through which much of Asia's oil passes. The piece argued that Australia had a diplomatic role to play in supporting pressure on Tehran.

First published in 2020 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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