Key points
- The rim-wide grouping launched in 1997 without a shared history or strong trade links among its members.
- Interest from its founding states faded quickly and its practical results were thin.
- Piracy, energy needs and shifting power drew India back, with Australia due to take over the chair.
- Its broad, non-military agenda was both a weakness and a possible strength.
Background
In 1997, South Africa, India, Australia and Mauritius led the creation of a regional association spanning the Indian Ocean rim, with seven more states joining at launch, among them Malaysia, Indonesia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka and Yemen. Its goals were broad: more trade and investment between members, shared data and standards, and networks among business and academic groups.
Each founder had its own reasons. India, after the Soviet collapse, was rethinking its foreign policy, looking to its neighbourhood and eastward after being kept out of a major Asia-Pacific trade forum. South Africa, emerging from apartheid, wanted a wider international role, and its leaders spoke of a natural community of ocean-facing states. Australia was seeking markets to its west, and Mauritius was keen to host the secretariat.
Unlike trade blocs built on existing commercial ties, this one had little shared economic history to draw on, and its members varied enormously in size, culture and wealth.
A slow start
By most accounts the association achieved little in its first decade. Business and civil society networks were formed and then withered. Australia lost interest when a 1999 ministerial meeting made clear that voluntary trade opening would not happen. South Africa's new leadership turned toward African bodies, and India found the grouping had not unlocked new trade or investment. Its absence from relief efforts after the 2004 tsunami underlined how marginal it had become, while a separate three-way southern forum with Brazil and South Africa drew more attention in New Delhi.
What changed
Several trends revived interest. Piracy off Somalia and Kenya and in open waters showed how much depended on safe sea lanes, and prompted unusual naval co-operation. Disputes over resource-rich islands further east, and competition between India and China for energy, hinted at a broader shift in power.
India's own thinking moved in three ways. It invested heavily in its navy and coastal defence, especially after the 2008 Mumbai attacks were launched from the sea. It became more open to naval exercises with the United States, Japan and Australia, a sharp change from a long tradition of keeping outside powers away. And it dropped older talk of the ocean as a zone of peace in favour of frank discussion of energy and trade interests, with oil import dependence expected to reach around 85 per cent. At the same time it was careful to present its navy as a stabilising presence rather than a power projector, and the rim association offered a co-operative setting for issues such as fisheries, the environment and piracy.
When India took the chair in 2011, its foreign minister spoke with fresh ambition about a shared regional future, named concrete concerns, and backed this with extra funding for the association. Australia, which would chair from 2013, pointed out that about a sixth of its goods exports went to member states and described itself as an Indian Ocean nation as much as a Pacific one.
What to watch
The association still drew little media or academic interest in 2012. Yet because it mixed trade, governance and environmental themes and could not be cast as a military bloc, it had room to grow. Back-to-back Indian and Australian chairmanships were seen as its best chance in years to gain real weight.
Why it matters for Australia
Australia was about to chair the grouping, giving it a platform to build ties with Indian Ocean economies that took a large share of its exports. The revival also reflected Australia's growing view of itself as a two-ocean nation.
First published in 2012 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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