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India's Energy Hunger and the Powers Competing to Feed It

A late-2018 assessment of how India's rising fuel imports tied it more closely to Russia, strained ties with Washington over Iran and set up rivalry with China.

2018Long readIndian Ocean4 min read

Key points

  • India was the third-largest energy consumer in 2017 and its demand was growing faster than China's or America's.
  • Deepening oil and gas links with Russia worried Washington, which wanted India on its side.
  • Renewed US sanctions on Iran threatened one of India's biggest crude sources.
  • With China, India mostly competed for regional influence, though joint pipelines and buyer groups were floated.

Background: a big consumer with few reserves

By 2017 India used more energy than any country except China and the United States. Its consumption was still well below either, but it was climbing faster, and India was expected to overtake China's growth rate before 2030. Unlike other large countries with long coastlines, India had found little oil or gas of its own, and restrictive rules had held back exploration.

Home-grown coal and biomass had so far sheltered India from much of the politics of imported fuel. That was ending. One estimate had imports rising from around a third of primary energy to more than half by 2040. Much depended on whether India could make use of its strong solar and wind resources and hit a target of quadrupling renewable capacity by 2022. Exporters, including Australia, were watching the mix closely.

The stakes went beyond trade. A 2018 global climate science assessment had made clear that if India followed the emissions path of richer economies, the global consequences would be severe. Yet most forecasts still had India buying more fossil fuel, including coal, for industry and transport.

What changed: closer to Moscow

At a summit in October 2018, the leaders of India and Russia restated plans to work together on energy, including oil and gas exploration in Russia's Arctic waters, nuclear power and renewables. Earlier that year, liquefied gas cargoes from Russia had begun arriving under a renegotiated long-term deal that cut volumes and improved pricing for the Indian buyer. In 2017 a Russian state oil major had bought nearly half of a large Indian refiner, the biggest foreign investment India had ever received.

The paper suggested some caution, given Russia's history of using gas supply as leverage in Europe, but judged the risk modest because India relied mainly on seaborne gas and had never managed to build long cross-border pipelines through Pakistan.

Friction with Washington

The deepening Russia link cut against American plans to isolate Moscow while drawing India closer. US policy on Iran made things harder. Since the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran had become India's third-largest crude supplier, and the then US administration reimposed sanctions with little thought for Iran's customers. India won a short waiver allowing reduced purchases, and a fall in oil prices softened the blow for a while. Earlier in 2018, oil above 80 US dollars a barrel and a weak rupee had brought protests onto Indian streets.

The piece argued that a 2017 energy partnership between the two countries had more to offer than export sales, and that India would gain more from American help with regulation across production, transport and consumption, and from a fuller role in the rich-country energy club it had just joined as an associate.

China: rival and occasional partner

India was also building its own arrangements: a proposed Asian buyers' group to win better terms from oil producers, a South Asian energy initiative, and gas terminals and power links with neighbours such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Mauritius. Those projects placed it in direct competition with China for influence. Beyond solar and coal equipment, the two had little energy to trade. Joint overseas ventures had produced little, though Chinese suggestions of shared pipelines kept the idea alive, and Chinese finance had already helped build the Arctic gas plant now supplying India.

Why it matters for Australia

Australia was already selling gas and coal to India, and the direction of India's energy mix shaped long-term demand for those exports. India's competition with China across the Indian Ocean also bore on the regional balance Australia relies on.

First published in 2018 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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