Key points
- China and Myanmar agreed in November 2018 on a deep-water port facing the Bay of Bengal.
- Thailand's leader ordered a fresh study of a Kra Isthmus canal, an idea China supported.
- Together these would ease China's reliance on the Malacca chokepoint and widen its access to the Indian Ocean.
- New fishing deals, border mining and gaps in Indian readiness added to New Delhi's concerns.
Background
For years many analysts played down the idea that China was building a chain of Indian Ocean footholds to hem in India. By late 2018, that view looked harder to sustain. China already had a presence in Djibouti, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and in November it signed a framework deal to build a deep-water port on Myanmar's western shore, facing the Bay of Bengal. A state-owned Chinese consortium would lead it, with China funding about 70 per cent and the first stage costing over a billion US dollars. The project had stalled since 2015, partly because Beijing had wanted an even larger stake, and partly because of growing caution after debt troubles over a Chinese-built port in Sri Lanka.
At almost the same time, Thailand's prime minister asked his security advisers to look again at a Kra Isthmus waterway of about 120 kilometres. China's ambassador had described the canal as part of Beijing's overseas infrastructure programme.
Why the pieces matter
Most of the oil and gas China buys from Africa and the Gulf must transit the Malacca chokepoint, a passage long patrolled by American warships. A Thai canal would shorten the voyage for Chinese ships, including warships, by roughly 1,200 kilometres and open a direct route into the Andaman Sea. Yet Thailand remained a long-standing US treaty ally and was unlikely to let Chinese naval vessels pass freely through its territory, even if the canal went ahead.
That is why the Myanmar port carried such weight. Tankers could unload there and send oil and gas by pipeline into south-west China, bypassing the strait altogether. China presented its infrastructure push as purely commercial, but the projects also extended its regional influence while trimming that of the United States, even when the economics were weak.
The wider pattern
These moves fitted a broader picture. China had built and then militarised artificial islands in the South China Sea from 2013, despite assurances to the contrary, and pressed claims over Taiwan and disputed East China Sea islands using gradual, low-level pressure rather than open force. In 2018 a large fishing agreement with Madagascar promised to bring hundreds of Chinese vessels into the western Indian Ocean, raising fears that the maritime militia tactics used in East Asian waters might appear there too.
On land, China began large-scale mining and infrastructure works in a Tibetan district bordering Arunachal Pradesh, which it claims as its own territory.
India's position
India had shown during a 2017 border standoff that it would face China down, but it had real weaknesses: shortages of ammunition, limited aircraft availability and difficulty getting spare parts. Russia, its traditional supplier, depended heavily on China as a customer and could not be counted on in a crisis. The conclusion drawn at the time was that India's policy of strategic autonomy, a successor to non-alignment, might need rethinking until it could withstand sustained Chinese pressure, with closer ties to the United States the most likely alternative.
Why it matters for Australia
Chinese access to the eastern Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal affects the sea lanes on Australia's western flank. India's response to that pressure also shaped its growing security partnership with Australia.
First published in 2018 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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