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A Resort With a Long Runway: Cambodia, China and India's Malacca Plans

Why a Chinese-built resort on Cambodia's coast raised fears in 2019 of a future naval base, and how it could blunt India's plans near the Strait of Malacca.

2019Long readIndian Ocean4 min read

Key points

  • A Chinese developer held a large coastal concession in Cambodia for a resort with an unusually long runway.
  • Cambodia denied any foreign base was planned, but China's record elsewhere fuelled doubts.
  • A Chinese site there could offset India's planned port at the Indian Ocean mouth of the Malacca Strait.
  • India's economic and military gap with China argued for closer ties with other partners.

Background

China's reliance on the Strait of Malacca for oil and gas shipped from the Gulf and Africa has long been a strategic weak point: in a conflict, the route could be closed to it. That concern helped explain Beijing's interest in ports in Pakistan and Myanmar and in the idea of a canal across Thailand's narrow southern neck. India, for its part, watched with growing unease as China gained access to ports around the Indian Ocean that might one day be used to hem it in.

A Thai canal remained a distant prospect in 2019. Cambodia was a far more immediate opportunity for China.

The Cambodian site

Cambodia's long-serving prime minister had openly favoured Beijing, contrasting Chinese respect with Western demands for democratic reform. Chinese investment had nearly doubled between 2012 and 2016 to about half of all foreign investment in the country, and Chinese money was building a new expressway from the capital to the main southern port.

A private Chinese company had been granted around 45,000 hectares, including a large share of the coastline, for a multi-billion-dollar resort, at a very low annual rent. Satellite images showed the planned airport runway was longer than the one serving the capital and could handle any aircraft in China's air force. A deep-water port was also part of the plan. Some observers reported that senior Cambodian officials were moving toward quiet acceptance of a naval presence under a long lease. Chinese warships had already visited a Cambodian port in early 2019.

Cambodia's leader insisted the constitution barred foreign bases and dismissed the reports as rumours. Yet China's conduct in the South China Sea, where it first denied plans to build islands, then called them humanitarian, then installed military facilities, suggested such denials could not be taken at face value.

Why it mattered to India

A base in Cambodia would let China watch traffic leaving the Malacca Strait for the South China Sea without relying only on forces from Hainan Island, keep an eye on Thai exercises with the United States, and cover any future Thai canal from the east.

It would also cut into a new Indian advantage. In 2018 India and Indonesia agreed on closer maritime co-operation, and India planned to help develop a deep-water port on a small island at the far northern end of Sumatra, at the western entrance to the strait. Together with India's forces in the Andaman Islands, that would give New Delhi a strong position to monitor, and if needed influence, shipping through the strait. A Chinese foothold in Cambodia, and possibly one day on Myanmar's coast, would weaken that edge and bring any future clash closer to India itself, possibly alongside pressure from Pakistan.

The wider balance

These scenarios were speculative, but strategic planning depends on such foresight. China in 2019 faced a trade war, a slowing economy and heavy debt, and might feel pressure to show its strength. India, meanwhile, was far behind: China's economy was roughly six times larger and its defence budget several times bigger. The conclusion at the time was that India would gain from setting aside strict strategic autonomy for now and building firmer ties with the United States and other partners, since bases alone mean little without the economic and military weight to use them.

Why it matters for Australia

A Chinese military presence on the Gulf of Thailand would sit close to sea lanes that carry much of Australia's trade with East Asia. India's moves near the Malacca Strait also fitted the closer maritime co-operation Australia was pursuing with both India and Indonesia.

First published in 2019 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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