Key points
- Saudi-funded colleges and scholarships were the main channel of religious influence in Indonesia.
- The annual pilgrimage to Mecca gave Riyadh quiet leverage over Jakarta's foreign policy.
- Large mainstream Muslim groups and the state's founding philosophy acted as brakes on Saudi doctrine.
- A gradual drift towards conservatism looked more likely than any nationwide adoption of the Saudi creed.
Background
For decades Saudi Arabia has promoted its own strict reading of Sunni Islam abroad, both as soft power and as a counterweight to its rival Iran. After the oil price surge of the 1970s and the Iranian revolution of 1979, the kingdom poured money into mosques, colleges and scholarships worldwide. Indonesia, home to more Muslims than any other country, was an obvious target, and the effort coincided with a wider religious revival across South-East Asia.
Two channels stood out. A Jakarta campus linked to a Riyadh university taught Arabic and the Saudi interpretation of the faith, and sent promising students to study in the kingdom. A proselytising council founded in the late 1960s became the main local recipient of Saudi money; its leaders were socially conservative, hostile to the authoritarian government of the day and critical of some religious minorities, according to researchers, which suited Riyadh's agenda. Graduates returning from Saudi universities formed the core of the push. Yet the results were not always predictable: at least one graduate later helped found a hard-line vigilante group that clashed with the authorities while openly rejecting Saudi doctrine.
Influence in 2020
By 2020 the institutions were long established, so Riyadh needed mainly to keep funding them. A Saudi-educated religious elite had moved into politics, pressing for stricter orthodoxy. Many observers also saw an Arabisation of Indonesian Islam, driven partly by the belief that practice in the land of the two holy cities is purer. That shift was most visible in small clusters, such as the island city of Batam near Singapore and Malaysia, where boarding schools and radio stations spread the strict creed.
The pilgrimage to Mecca gave the kingdom another lever. Jakarta regularly lobbied for a larger quota of pilgrims, and the cancellation of the 2020 pilgrimage during the pandemic stirred anger at home. Any rupture with Riyadh risked cutting access for ordinary Indonesians, a political cost no government wanted to bear.
The brakes
Indonesia's two largest mainstream Muslim organisations strongly opposed the Saudi creed, and the larger of them led a campaign against intolerance, with its youth wing sometimes blocking hard-line preachers. The state also leaned on its founding five-principle philosophy and on nationalism. In 2017 it banned a transnational Islamist group for breaching those principles, and the defence ministry launched a mass civilian programme built on patriotic values. The armed forces generally sought to keep religious groups onside, though their secular-nationalist core had long distrusted political Islam.
The strict movement itself was split between political activists, quietists who shunned politics and a violent fringe, and between older pragmatic clerics and a more devout younger generation shaped by online preachers with millions of followers.
What to watch
In 2018 the Saudi envoy in Jakarta caused a stir by publicly calling the youth wing of Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation heretical, in a post later deleted. Some feared Saudi influence could feed intolerance and make people easier prey for extremist recruiters, though that view was likely too simple. Reforms inside Saudi Arabia, including the end of flogging, hinted at softer exports over time. The likeliest outcome was a slow, uneven drift towards conservatism rather than a national embrace of the Saudi creed, with marginal groups most exposed.
Why it matters for Australia
Religious trends in Indonesia bear directly on social cohesion and security in Australia's nearest large neighbour. Gulf money and ideas shaping South-East Asian Islam formed part of the wider Indian Ocean picture that Australian policymakers had to read carefully.
First published in 2020 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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