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Fewer Ships, Smaller Slice: India's Navy Under Budget Pressure

How a shrinking share of India's defence spending in 2020 forced its navy to scale back fleet plans, and how a troubled carrier purchase exposed weak political oversight.

2020Short analysisIndian Ocean3 min read

Key points

  • The navy's share of India's defence budget fell from about 18 per cent in 2012 to about 13 per cent in 2019-20.
  • Fleet goals were cut from 200 ships to 175, and from three aircraft carriers to two.
  • A second-hand carrier bought from Russia arrived years late, far over budget and poorly armed.
  • Its fighter jets suffered serious engine faults that limited how far the carrier could operate.

Background

India's navy had long aimed to field a fleet of around 200 warships by 2027. In early 2020 that goal looked out of reach. The navy's chief warned that its slice of the national defence budget had dropped from roughly 18 per cent in 2012 to around 13 per cent by the 2019-20 financial year, and said the service would have to prioritise and economise. The overall defence budget was not shrinking, but the navy's portion of capital spending trailed both the army and the air force.

The navy's tasks are broad: deterring war, winning if one comes, protecting India's coast, citizens and offshore assets, shaping events on land and keeping trade routes open. Those demands call for capable ships, well-trained crews and long experience.

What changed

Under the tighter budget, the planned fleet was reduced to 175 vessels. The navy had hoped for three aircraft carriers, so that two could be at sea while one was in maintenance, but now expected to manage with two. Ships already under construction were not expected to be affected.

A cautionary purchase

Political handling of earlier deals added to the strain. Talks to acquire a retired Russian cruiser and convert it into a carrier began in 1994. Delivery was promised for 2008, but the work was only half finished by 2007, and Russia then demanded billions of dollars more, threatening to cancel. India gave way, and the national auditor later found it had paid far more than a new carrier would have cost. The ship was finally commissioned in 2013, with too few defensive weapons, so missiles were taken from a retired frigate to fill the gap.

Its fighter jets fared little better. Many of their engines had design faults, forcing the carrier to stay within range of land bases in case of failure. A former navy chief blamed weak quality control and poor support from Russian industry.

What to watch

The lesson drawn at the time was that India's sailors were capable and committed, but were being let down by tight funding and by poor political decisions on what to buy and how.

Why it matters for Australia

India's navy is a key partner for Australia in the Indian Ocean, so limits on its growth affected the regional balance both countries hoped to sustain. Its procurement troubles also showed the risks of relying on a single foreign supplier for major platforms.

First published in 2020 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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