Key points
- Tourism had become a central pillar of Indonesia's economy, with Chinese visitors driving recent growth.
- A target of twenty million foreign visitors by 2019 looked out of reach given weak infrastructure and funding gaps.
- Travel catering to Muslim visitors was an emerging market with real potential.
- Costly, slow visitor visas helped explain why so few Indonesian holidaymakers came to Australia.
Background
Foreign arrivals in Indonesia had more than doubled in a decade, reaching around 14 million in 2017. Counting indirect spending, travel and tourism made up roughly six per cent of the economy, and the government had made the sector a centrepiece of its growth plans. Its tourism minister wanted to lift annual arrivals to twenty million by 2019.
That goal looked too ambitious. Reaching it would have needed growth of almost a fifth every year for three years, well above the recent average and rarely seen anywhere in South-East Asia. The same minister had earlier promised to double Chinese arrivals within two years, and growth had fallen well short, if still strong.
Infrastructure and a plan for new hubs
The bigger brake was infrastructure. The country needed hundreds of billions of dollars for roads, ports, power and airports, and government budgets seemed likely to fall far short. Loans and bilateral deals with China, Japan and multilateral lenders helped, but many were driven by politics rather than commercial logic, so money flowed slowly. A global competitiveness survey in 2017 rated Indonesia's tourist services infrastructure as its weakest area, alongside poor ground and port transport. New hotels and roads also had to be built without spoiling the forests and beaches that drew visitors in the first place.
In early 2016 the president launched a plan for ten new tourist hubs modelled on Bali's success. Nearly half of foreign visitors went to Bali and nearly a third to Java, islands that together cover a small fraction of the country's land. The chosen sites, including a crater lake in Sumatra, a famous temple complex in Java and a resort zone on Lombok, were already known but hard to reach. Lake Toba showed the problem: visitors once faced a domestic flight to Medan followed by hours on the road, until a new airport nearby promised to cut the trip sharply. Most of the sites still lacked the capacity for large numbers of visitors.
Who was coming
Chinese arrivals had recently passed the long-dominant source markets of Singapore, Malaysia and Australia, and could reach a fifth of all visitors by 2019. Chinese tourists spent slightly less than average per trip, and shopping was no longer their main reason to travel. Halal tourism, offering hotels and restaurants without alcohol or pork, plus separate prayer or swimming areas, was a promising niche. Visitors from the Middle East spent well above average, yet relatively few came, and nearby South Asia offered another pool of Muslim travellers. Indonesia had climbed to fourth place in one global ranking for Muslim-friendly travel.
The Australian side
Australians were a steady, dependable market, and tourism earned Indonesia more from Australia than any of its goods exports. The flow in the other direction was thin. Indonesian arrivals in Australia had barely grown, and Australia drew about twice as many holidaymakers from Singapore and Malaysia, despite their much smaller populations. Few Indonesians travelled abroad at all, but visas also mattered: Indonesians needed a costly paper-heavy visitor visa that could take weeks and was not refunded if refused, while Singaporeans and Malaysians got cheap online approval within a day. Indonesia's own decision to waive its arrival fee for Australians had paid for itself through extra visitors, suggesting Australia could recover lost fees with a modest rise in Indonesian arrivals.
Why it matters for Australia
Tourism was one of the strongest links between the two neighbours, yet the traffic ran almost entirely one way. Easing visa costs and paperwork for Indonesian holidaymakers was one of the few levers Australia held directly to deepen a relationship that otherwise lacked economic breadth.
First published in 2018 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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