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India's Defence Direction After the 2019 Election

What India's re-elected government in 2019 was expected to do on deterrence, limited war, military reform and its wider reach into the Indo-Pacific.

2019Long readIndian Ocean3 min read

Key points

  • India's returning government was expected to widen its strategic presence across the Indo-Pacific.
  • It sought to deter China and Pakistan alike, in both conventional and nuclear terms.
  • Army doctrine stressed fast, limited offensives by smaller combined-arms formations.
  • A single senior military adviser to government was seen as the key missing reform.

Background

When India's ruling party was returned to office in 2019, its partners across the Indo-Pacific, Australia among them, watched for signs of how the second term would shape defence and foreign policy. The broad expectation was a more muscular stance: a larger strategic footprint in the region and a firmer deterrent posture towards Pakistan and China, without any change to the balance between civilian leaders and the armed forces.

The party's election platform had raised the idea of revisiting India's long-held pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. On the outward side, India was also reaching out to help regional countries build up their forces, including closer defence ties with New Zealand covering logistics, amphibious training and counter-terrorism.

Limited war and army doctrine

India had shown it was willing to strike across the border into Pakistan after militant attacks, as it did in 2016 and again in February 2019. A new land warfare doctrine released in 2018, following the first joint doctrine for the three services a year earlier, accepted that room for conventional war under a nuclear shadow had narrowed, yet kept conventional operations at the centre of army planning.

Its core idea traced back to a concept from 2004. That earlier plan grew out of the slow mobilisation after the 2001 attack on India's parliament, when moving large forces to the frontier took about three weeks. The aim was to launch several quick, shallow thrusts into Pakistan within days, fast enough to finish before outside powers stepped in and limited enough to stay below the nuclear threshold. To do this, large strike formations would be broken into smaller, self-contained battle groups of armour, artillery and aviation, based nearer the border. The doctrine left open what would happen if a nuclear line were crossed, and it also flagged the risk of a two-front conflict with Pakistan and China at once.

Modernisation and reform

Several items stood out on the government's agenda at the time:

  • Joint command. Appointing a standing chair of the service chiefs' committee, as a step towards a single defence chief, would help bring the three services' plans together.
  • Naval growth. The navy gained funds for new projects and further aircraft carriers to extend its reach across the region.
  • The northern frontier. Funds went to border railways, and there was talk of new mountain strike forces and of turning some strike formations from Pakistan towards China on the Tibetan plateau.
  • Morale. Unresolved pay disputes from the last pay review weighed on the forces.

A wider weakness was the lack of a published defence review setting out strategic priorities, which made budgets hard to read and planning hard to align.

What to watch

The central question was whether India could become a real counterweight to China, especially at sea, while remaining fixed on Pakistan. Reform so far had dealt with operational and tactical problems but not with strategy, and closer civil-military dialogue was needed for that to change.

Why it matters for Australia

Australia had been seeking closer strategic ties with India, so the direction of Indian defence policy, and especially its maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean and beyond, bore directly on Canberra's regional plans. A stronger Indian navy also changed the balance in waters Australia shares.

First published in 2019 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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