Key points
- Pakistan's nuclear posture was built to deter Indian conventional retaliation, which left peace resting on Indian restraint.
- A nuclear exchange in South Asia carried risks well beyond the region, including to world food supplies.
- India saw China as encircling it through ties with its neighbours and new Indian Ocean ports.
- Growing Indian military power was unlikely to overturn the basic regional balance in the near term.
The Pakistan problem
In 2011, India's closest and most troubled relationship remained the one with Pakistan. The two had fought wars in 1965 and 1971, clashed again in the Kashmir highlands after both tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and come close to conflict after attacks in Kashmir and Delhi in late 2001. Each time, India held back from striking across the border.
Pakistan's geography explains much of its thinking. The country is narrow, its major cities sit near the frontier, and a determined Indian offensive could cut it in two. Its military therefore treated any large conventional attack as a threat to the state's survival and signalled that nuclear weapons could be used early. The effect was to shield militant groups operating from Pakistani soil, because India could not punish them without risking escalation. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed more than 160 people, India again stopped short of military action.
India's army answered with a doctrine of quick, shallow incursions meant to stay below Pakistan's nuclear threshold. Critics warned this could push Pakistan to lower that threshold further or keep weapons at higher readiness. Weak early warning and command systems on both sides added the risk of accident or misreading. Studies cited at the time suggested a regional exchange could kill tens of millions and throw enough smoke into the sky to damage harvests worldwide.
Inside Pakistan, power was shared between a landowning and business elite and the army, which most citizens saw as the nation's protector and which held large commercial interests of its own. Tax collection was weak and outside bailouts reduced pressure to reform. For all its flaws, the army was then the institution most able to hold the country together, while hard-line militant networks remained entrenched in the border provinces.
The China challenge
China posed a different kind of test. It had become India's largest trading partner, with two-way trade above 50 billion dollars, and the two economies were in many ways complementary. Yet Beijing also armed Pakistan, built military ties with Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and developed deep-water ports around the Indian Ocean. To many in New Delhi this looked like a deliberate effort to hem India in.
On land, China disputed the colonial-era border line and pressed claims over much of Arunachal Pradesh. Patrol incursions led India to move tens of thousands of troops and modern aircraft into the area. For Beijing, firm control of Tibet was seen as essential security against a large and growing neighbour, and India's long hosting of Tibetan exiles remained a sore point.
At sea, most of China's oil and gas imports crossed the Indian Ocean, and its navy was expanding to protect those routes. Each side's search for security tended to look like a threat to the other.
The balance that held
Despite the tension, both India and China kept small, survivable nuclear forces designed for retaliation rather than first use, which lent a degree of stability. The judgement in 2011 was that India's rise would extend its reach into the Indian Ocean but would not quickly change the underlying balance. Pakistan was already outmatched conventionally and relied on its nuclear deterrent, while India and China were evenly enough matched, and economically tied enough, to make open conflict unlikely, even if friction on the border and at sea persisted.
Why it matters for Australia
Australia's interests in the Indian Ocean depended on stable relations among the region's nuclear powers and on secure sea lanes to its west. The India, Pakistan and China triangle shaped the strategic setting in which Australia built closer ties with New Delhi.
First published in 2011 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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