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India's Island Outpost at the Mouth of the Malacca Strait

Why the Andaman and Nicobar chain was gaining weight in Indian naval planning in 2017, from sea denial and a possible new fleet to undersea surveillance with partners.

2017Long readIndian Ocean3 min read

Key points

  • The islands sit beside the western approach to the Malacca Strait, one of the world's busiest shipping routes.
  • India was expected to build up forces there to support sea denial against Chinese naval activity.
  • A third Indian fleet and a container transhipment hub on the islands were both under discussion.
  • Undersea listening networks shared with the United States and Japan were floated, with room for Australia.

Background

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands form a long north-south chain of several hundred islands, only a few dozen of them inhabited, where the Andaman Sea meets the Bay of Bengal. The northern tip lies close to Myanmar and the southern tip not far from Indonesia. The chain forms a bridge between the subcontinent and South-East Asia and overlooks the channels leading to and from the Malacca Strait. All ships using the strait pass through the southern channel, and tens of thousands of commercial vessels use these waters each year. The islands are a tiny share of India's land area but give it close to a third of its offshore economic zone.

Lying well over a thousand kilometres from the Indian mainland, the islands extend India's reach east. India set up its only joint command, bringing army, navy and air force under one structure, there in 2001, and a maritime security strategy released in early 2016 stressed the chain as a springboard for projecting power towards the western Pacific.

Role in naval strategy

At the time of writing, India's response to Chinese naval activity rested with its eastern fleet on the mainland coast. Growing infrastructure on the islands raised the prospect of a permanent fleet based there. Expected steps included:

  • stationing warships, including amphibious landing ships, and a sea-based nuclear missile capability as a deterrent
  • sensors and tracking systems to identify shipping and support networked operations
  • facilities to host carriers and submarines, special forces, and fighter and maritime strike squadrons
  • possible access to training areas and airfields for partners such as the United States, Australia, Japan and New Zealand

Indian strategy put weight on sea denial, the approach of a weaker force that stops an opponent using nearby waters rather than trying to dominate them outright. The islands are well placed for this and could form an exclusion zone in a conflict, aimed mainly at keeping China's southern fleet out of the Indian Ocean.

A third fleet and a trade hub

Plans pointed to a third, far-eastern naval command on the islands, which would require a large rise in the number of Indian warships over the following decade. A container transhipment port in the Nicobars could rival hubs such as Singapore or Colombo and support closer cooperation with regional navies, including Australia's fleet based near Perth. India kept no standing forces in the Pacific at the time, though that was not ruled out.

Existing facilities were modest: two full-length airstrips, two shorter ones, and several natural harbours, including a deep one in the southern Nicobars.

Listening under the sea

India was also expected to join Japan and the Americans in laying undersea acoustic sensors near the islands to monitor Chinese submarines, possibly linked to an existing allied network and a new fibre-optic cable from Chennai. Reports that China was building its own seabed sensor array in the South China Sea may have spurred the idea. Australia could join such an effort and gain a better picture of submarine movements in the eastern Indian Ocean.

Why it matters for Australia

The islands overlook sea lanes that carry much of Australia's trade with Asia and the Middle East, and partner access or a shared sensor network would draw Australia into closer naval cooperation with India. The prospect of an Indian fleet working near Australia's western fleet shaped regional planning.

First published in 2017 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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