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Upstream Leverage: China's Dams and the Future of the Lower Mekong

How China's chain of large upstream dams, and its lending for more dams downstream, gave Beijing new leverage over the countries of mainland South-East Asia by 2020.

2020Long readIndian Ocean4 min read

Key points

  • Tens of millions of people in the lower Mekong basin rely on the river for food and income.
  • New evidence in 2020 linked falling river levels downstream to water held back in Chinese reservoirs.
  • Chinese lending for dams in Laos and Cambodia deepened their debt and their dependence on Beijing.
  • Western efforts to offer an alternative in the region were modest by comparison.

Background

The Mekong supplies water, power and food to six countries. Around 250 million people live in its lower basin, and most of them depend on the river directly, not least through what is often described as the world's richest inland fishery. By 2020 the river was also among the most threatened anywhere, chiefly because of the volume of water now stored behind large dams.

China had built 11 major dams on its upper stretch of the river, storing tens of billions of cubic metres. It had not joined any treaty on sharing the river, treated its flow data as secret, and left downstream states reliant on its goodwill. Only a modest share of the lower river's water comes from China in a normal year, but in the dry season and in drought that share can climb past 40 per cent, which is exactly when leverage matters most.

The 2019 drought and new evidence

In 2019 river levels across the lower basin fell to record lows. Thailand sent troops to help drought-stricken districts in its north-east, fishing communities around Cambodia's great lake reported catches collapsing, and parts of Vietnam's delta lost access to fresh water. Rice output in Thailand and Vietnam dropped sharply. Beijing blamed a regional rainfall shortfall and denied its dams played any part.

A scientific study released in 2020 challenged that account. Using river gauge records and satellite data, it found the upper basin had in fact received above-average rain and snowmelt, and that the river would have stayed well above normal downstream had Chinese reservoirs not been filling. Water levels had dropped markedly from 2012, when several large Chinese dams came into operation. Sudden releases from upstream had also caused unexpected floods and costly damage in earlier years.

Since the Chinese dams generated relatively little power and other energy sources were becoming cheaper, the suspicion grew that storage itself was the point: water could be held for later use, possibly diverted elsewhere in China, or held back to pressure neighbours. There was no sign of diversion yet, but the capacity existed.

Debt and influence downstream

Lower-basin states had also been building. Laos, which covers the largest slice of the basin and hoped to become a regional power exporter, had built dozens of tributary dams and planned a string of mainstream ones, several with Chinese backing. Its public debt was heading toward 70 per cent of output, much of it owed to China. Cambodia, a close Chinese partner that had twice blocked regional statements critical of Beijing, deferred two Chinese-backed mainstream dams until after 2030. Thailand bought power from a large Lao dam to reduce its gas dependence, even as river levels below that dam fell.

In 2015 China set up its own river co-operation forum, rivalling the body the lower states had used since the mid-1990s, and folded it into a wider push for a friendlier neighbourhood.

What to watch

The United States opposed mainstream dams, partly to support Vietnam as the most downstream country, and ran a lower-basin programme backed by allies including Australia. But it was thinly funded and no match for Chinese infrastructure spending. Some regional officials had begun to describe the river as a second South China Sea, with control of water, rather than territory, as the source of pressure.

Why it matters for Australia

Australia backed Western efforts on data sharing and cleaner power in the lower Mekong, and stability in mainland South-East Asia bears on its own security and trade. Chinese leverage over the river was a test of how far Australia and its partners could offer credible alternatives.

First published in 2020 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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