Key points
- Xinjiang is central to China's westward trade plans, but it borders some of Asia's least secure regions.
- Large-scale detention of Uighurs drew little public criticism from Muslim-majority governments tied to China economically.
- Extremist networks displaced from Iraq and Syria were regrouping in the Afghan and Pakistani borderlands.
- The Uighur cause risked becoming a rallying call that could bring attacks back into China.
Background
Most of China's Uighurs, a Turkic and largely Muslim people, live in Xinjiang in the country's north-west. The region matters greatly to Beijing. It borders eight states, including Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, holds large energy and mineral reserves, and serves as the land gateway for China's large overseas infrastructure programme heading west through Central Asia towards the Gulf.
By 2018, Chinese authorities were conducting a sweeping campaign in Xinjiang that they described as aimed at separatism. A human rights panel of the world body reported that hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million, Uighurs were being held in so-called re-education camps. Since around 2016, measures had also targeted religious practice, including restrictions on prayer and fasting.
A muted response
International reaction was weak. Governments and religious leaders in the Muslim world, from the Gulf to Central Asia and South-East Asia, said little in public, and the issue barely registered in their media. Growing economic ties help explain the silence. In mid-2018, for example, Beijing hosted Arab foreign ministers and pledged roughly 23 billion US dollars in loans and aid to the region, partly to protect its trade routes. The analysis warned that this silence could breed frustration among people living near Xinjiang, many of whom share faith, language or family ties with the Uighurs.
The neighbourhood risk
Xinjiang's closeness to the Afghan and Pakistani border areas cut both ways. Those areas had long been home to many armed groups, and after the extremist movement that had seized parts of Iraq and Syria lost its territory around 2017, many of its fighters dispersed. A regional offshoot had built a network across Pakistan and in eastern and northern Afghanistan, drawing on weak government control, rugged terrain and poverty. It found particular traction in Baluchistan, a poor south-western province with its own separatist history.
The analysis argued that a cause framed as defending oppressed Muslims could help such a network attract recruits and persuade rival militant groups to set aside their differences. It also pointed to older currents: a broader Turkic nationalist idea in Central Asia, and short-lived Turkic and Islamic states that had arisen in what is now Xinjiang in the nineteenth century and again in the 1930s.
A warning from the past
A harsh crackdown in Xinjiang in the 1990s had pushed some Uighurs into Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they formed an armed group that later attacked targets in China before moving its fighters to Syria. With that conflict winding down, the group's return to the region seemed likely. If it aligned with the regional offshoot, Han Chinese living in Xinjiang could become targets, a risk sharpened by policies placing Han officials in Uighur homes for monitoring.
What to watch
The analysis also flagged rivalry among outside powers, unemployed Afghans returning from Iran under new sanctions, and stalled efforts to bring armed groups to talks. Taken together, it argued, China's policies in Xinjiang risked turning a domestic security campaign into a regional one, with consequences that could reach well beyond its own borders.
Why it matters for Australia
Instability spreading from the Afghan and Pakistani borderlands could touch the wider Indian Ocean region, including South-East Asian states close to Australia where returning fighters were also a concern. China's handling of Xinjiang also became a lasting human rights and diplomatic issue that shaped Australia's relationship with Beijing.
First published in 2018 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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