Key points
- Both Solomon Islands and Kiribati dropped Taiwan in favour of Beijing in September 2019.
- Chinese investment in the region far outstripped Taiwan's, raising worries about debt.
- A bid to lease a strategic Solomons island was blocked by the national government.
- Many Chinese projects in the Pacific appeared to have both civilian and military uses.
Background
In September 2019 Solomon Islands ended its diplomatic links with Taiwan and recognised Beijing instead. China moved fast, with its foreign minister promising the country development opportunities on a new scale, while Solomon Islands leaders said the switch served the national interest and acknowledged that their development needs were huge. In the same month Kiribati made the same change. In both cases the size of the investment on offer weighed heavily: estimates put China's spending in the region at many times Taiwan's.
Chequebook diplomacy was not new, but the lending terms and the risk of unpayable debt were a growing worry. Using infrastructure to win formal recognition and draw small states into its orbit had become a familiar Chinese approach.
More than recognition
Taiwan was the obvious loser, but Beijing also appeared to be building a counterweight to American influence in the Pacific, much as it had done with port projects elsewhere in Asia that could serve both trade and naval needs.
- Solomon Islands. A Chinese company sought a lease over Tulagi, an island that served as a strong anchorage during the Second World War and that lies within range of the American base on Guam. The provincial government approved it, but the national authorities rejected the deal as unlawful. Public support for Chinese investment was far from unanimous, with fears of debt and militarisation.
- Kiribati. China had broken off relations in 2003 when Kiribati recognised Taiwan. A tracking station there had supported China's first crewed space flight and was reported to help watch a United States missile test site in the region. With plans for a moon landing, China would need more such stations.
Satellites and strategy
China's own satellite navigation network, recognised for international maritime use in 2014, reduced its dependence on the American system and protected links needed for its strategic forces. It was also expanding fast, with plans for global and even undersea coverage. Ground facilities in the Pacific supported that effort.
What to watch
Isolating Taiwan remained a goal for Beijing, but its gains in the Pacific islands carried wider weight. As more island states turned towards China, concern grew that a Chinese military presence could follow and spark a regional arms race.
Why it matters for Australia
The South-West Pacific is Australia's immediate neighbourhood, and a Chinese foothold there would change the security picture close to home. The 2019 diplomatic switches sharpened Australian attention on aid, infrastructure and debt in the island states.
First published in 2019 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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