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After the Deadly Himalayan Border Clash: India's Options With China

A June 2020 look at the fatal clash between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh, the possible reasons behind it, and how India might respond over the longer term.

2020Long readIndian Ocean3 min read

Key points

  • Twenty Indian soldiers died in a mid-June 2020 clash, the first such deaths on the border since 1975.
  • The violence came despite repeated leader summits and several border agreements since 1993.
  • Possible drivers included Indian road building, closer India-US ties, tensions in South Asia and pressures inside China.
  • The suggested response was a steadier, multi-layered strategy rather than boycotts and nationalist rhetoric.

Background: what happened

On 15 June 2020, tension along the disputed de facto border between India and China in Ladakh turned deadly. Twenty Indian soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand fighting with Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley, and China acknowledged losses of its own. Only days earlier, India's army chief had said both sides were pulling back. It was the first time Indian troops had died on that frontier since 1975, and the standoff, by then about 40 days old, was among the longest on record. A previous two-month standoff in 2017 had begun when China started building a road on a plateau claimed by Bhutan.

Each government blamed the other for breaking an understanding to respect the line. India's prime minister said the country wanted peace but was ready for war, while voices in Chinese state media warned India not to mistake restraint for weakness.

The clash was especially jarring because the two leaders had met many times since 2014, including informal summits in 2018 and 2019 meant to keep the border calm, on top of a series of agreements dating back to 1993.

Reactions inside India

Social media filled with calls to boycott Chinese products, echoing earlier campaigns. Some business groups and ministers backed a ban, but more measured figures, including a former prime minister, warned that a blanket boycott made little economic sense. The government took narrower steps: it had already tightened rules on Chinese investment, told state-owned telecom firms not to use Chinese equipment in network upgrades, and considered requiring online sellers to show where goods were made. Commentators often invoked the 1962 war, a defeat that still weighed on national memory, to argue that India was now far stronger.

Why now?

Analysts offered several explanations beyond the immediate trigger of Indian road building near the valley:

  • India's warmer ties with the United States, Australia and Vietnam, and its shifting stance on Taiwan.
  • India's support for an inquiry into the origins of the pandemic and its welcome for a proposal to widen the group of seven leading economies.
  • Strains between India and its neighbours, including Pakistan and Nepal, which had published maps claiming disputed land.
  • Economic slowdown and criticism over the pandemic, which may have pushed China's leadership to change the story at home.

The article cautioned that simple explanations of Chinese behaviour were risky.

What India could do

The piece argued that closer strategic ties with Washington were useful but should be weighed for concrete gains, and that India should stop treating summit diplomacy as proof of goodwill. It recommended being less predictable, pursuing goals quietly, focusing partnerships, and above all reviving the economy to narrow the large gap with China. Stronger trade links with South Asian neighbours and with other countries looking to reduce reliance on China were also urged. Finally, it called for deeper study of China's domestic politics and strategic thinking, and less reactive, nationalist media coverage. No single tool would suffice; India needed a layered approach.

Why it matters for Australia

The clash came just as India and Australia were deepening ties built around an open Indo-Pacific, so any India-China rupture shaped the wider regional balance. How India managed its contest with China bore on the partnerships Australia was building across the Indian Ocean.

First published in 2020 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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