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Dams, Fish and Rice: What Mekong Hydropower Meant for Downstream Food

How a wave of hydropower dams in China, Laos and Cambodia threatened the fisheries, rice fields and incomes of people living along the lower Mekong in 2016.

2016Long readWater and Food3 min read

Key points

  • Mekong dams promised power and export income but put downstream fisheries and rice farming at risk.
  • Fish passes and engineered bypass channels had a poor track record of keeping migration routes open.
  • Fish farming could fill part of the gap, provided enforceable standards kept it sustainable.
  • Less sediment and more salt water threatened rice output in Vietnam's delta.

A river that feeds a region

The Mekong rises in the Tibetan highlands, runs through Yunnan and then crosses or borders Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam before reaching the sea. More than 70 million people live in its lower basin, and the large majority of rural households there rely on the river directly for food and income. It supports one of the biggest inland fisheries on the planet, worth roughly US$17 billion a year at the time, and fish was the main source of protein for many riverside communities. Its water and silt also sustain some of the most productive rice land in Asia.

The hydropower push

Plans to dam the Mekong dated back to the 1950s but stalled through war, unrest and the late 1990s financial crisis. By 2016, regional stability and fast-growing power demand had revived them, and as many as 70 dams could be running along the river by 2030. China had already built a cascade on its upper stretch. Laos aimed to become a power exporter to its neighbours, and a large mainstream dam in its north was being built mostly to sell electricity to Thailand, even after Cambodia and Vietnam asked for work to pause until cross-border effects were studied. A second Laotian project in the Siphandone wetlands, home to a vast small-scale fishery, was taken on by a property developer with no dam-building record. Cambodia planned two large dams and hoped hydropower would cover most of its electricity needs.

Many of these were described as run-of-river schemes, seen as gentler than big storage reservoirs. In practice they could still change the river's flow, depth and temperature, and those that held water back for peak demand released it in sudden surges.

Why fish and rice were at risk

Around 70 per cent of Mekong fish species migrate, moving between the sea, the main channel, tributaries and floodplains. A Thai dam on a Mekong tributary, finished in 1994, showed what could go wrong: its fish ladder failed, upstream stocks collapsed and dozens of fishing villages lost their livelihoods despite promises of recovery. Similar fish passes and newly cleared side channels were being relied on for the new Laotian projects, with no proof they would work.

Losing wild fish would push people to find other protein, possibly by clearing forest for grazing, or to import more food at odds with national self-sufficiency goals. Fish farming already supplied most of Vietnam's fish and could expand, but it narrowed species diversity, spread disease and polluted water unless well regulated.

Rice faced a separate threat. Dams trap the silt that renews soils in the Vietnamese delta, which grew more than half the country's rice and much of its fish. Weaker river flows would let seawater push further inland across low-lying land already stressed by a warming climate. A study lodged by Vietnam in 2016 warned of severe losses to farming and fisheries in both Vietnam and Cambodia.

What to watch

Cross-border cooperation over the river was weak, and Laos had pressed ahead despite objections from downstream neighbours. Unless alternative sources of food and income were developed, tens of millions of people below China's dams risked ending up worse off.

Why it matters for Australia

The lower Mekong countries were important regional partners and markets, and food or water stress there could unsettle the stability of mainland South-East Asia. Australia's own experience managing a shared, heavily regulated river basin gave it a direct interest in how the Mekong states handled cross-border water decisions.

First published in 2016 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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