Key points
- Both China and India face mounting pressure on water, food and energy as their populations and cities grow.
- China sits upstream on the Brahmaputra, which gives it leverage over India and Bangladesh downstream.
- Poor data sharing and secrecy about Chinese dams fuelled suspicion in India.
- Open communication, shared data and better water management at home were seen as the best ways to lower the risk of conflict.
Background
The Brahmaputra rises in Tibet, where it is called the Yarlung Zangbo, and runs for close to 3,000 kilometres through India and Bangladesh before joining the Ganges and emptying into the Bay of Bengal. Much of India's water comes from rivers that begin on the Tibetan plateau, so what happens upstream in China matters a great deal downstream.
Both countries were already under water stress in 2016. Climate change, shrinking aquifers, urban growth and rising populations were pressing on limited supplies. The question of Tibet and a long-running border quarrel over Arunachal Pradesh added to the strain, and Chinese dam construction on the upper river made it worse.
Two thirsty neighbours
India receives heavy monsoon rain but cannot hold much of it, with surface storage only a fraction of China's. Farming uses roughly nine-tenths of the water India draws, and any shift in monsoon patterns would hit harvests hard. Demand was projected to outrun supply well before mid-century.
China's problem was uneven distribution and pollution. Its dry north, home to much of its farming and coal industry, gets only a small slice of national rainfall, and much of the country's groundwater was badly contaminated. Cheap, subsidised water gave households and industry little reason to save it. Rising incomes, bigger cities and richer diets pointed to steadily higher demand.
Why the river became a flashpoint
In 2000 a dam failure in Tibet sent floodwaters into Arunachal Pradesh, killing about 30 people. India had no warning because the two sides did not exchange river data, and some Indian officials suspected the flood was deliberate, although satellite images later showed it was an accident. When China announced a hydro plant on the river's middle course in 2008, India read it as the first step towards diverting the river. Beijing was slow to share details and the information it released was inconsistent. By the end of 2015 the plant was fully running, and China maintained that its run-of-river schemes posed little threat.
A larger worry was talk of a scheme to divert water at the river's great bend towards China's arid north. Critics in India warned that it could sharply cut flows and raise salinity downstream, though Beijing called the idea too costly and too risky. Indian experts were divided: some noted that most of the river's volume comes from rain falling inside India, while others pointed out that this water arrives only in the monsoon, so even a small cut upstream could hurt in the dry months.
China had not signed the global convention on shared watercourses agreed in 1997, and it preferred one-on-one deals over regional ones. India, for its part, had reduced flows into Bangladesh through its own dams, pushing some farmers to migrate and stoking ethnic friction in Assam.
What could lower the risk
Close trade ties kept the chance of open conflict low, but a deepening US-India partnership could tempt China to use its upstream position as leverage. The long-standing treaty dividing the Indus system between India and Pakistan showed that rivals can share a river. A 2013 understanding in which China agreed to provide more flood-season data was a start, but steps that would help further included:
- fuller and more reliable sharing of river data, and joint research
- a shift by Beijing from reacting to disputes to heading them off
- better water management at home in both countries, including storage in India and pollution control in China
Why it matters for Australia
Water tension between Asia's two largest powers bears on the stability of the Indian Ocean region where Australia trades and builds partnerships. The case also shows how shared river basins, much like those in Australia's own federation, depend on trust and good data.
First published in 2016 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.
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