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Why Beijing Chose Barley, Wine and Beef: Reading the 2020 Trade Barriers

How China picked which Australian farm exports to block in 2020, weighing the damage to Australia against costs and gains for its own industries.

2020Long readRegions4 min read

Key points

  • In 2020 China placed formal or informal barriers on eight Australian farm commodities.
  • Targets were chosen to hurt Australia while limiting harm to China, and sometimes to protect Chinese producers.
  • Wool was spared because Chinese mills had no other source of fine fibre.
  • Australia avoided retaliation, turned to trade law and pushed harder on market diversification.

Background

During 2020, China imposed trade measures on around a dozen Australian industries, from coal to tourism, but farm exports took the heaviest share of attention. Barley faced steep tariffs, a dumping probe was opened into wine, several beef plants lost access, and cotton, timber, lobster, wheat and sugar shipments met delays, quota warnings or rumours of bans. The moves followed a public list of Chinese complaints about Australian policy. China then took close to a third of Australia's agricultural exports, so the stakes were real.

A useful way to read these events is as economic coercion: one state applies trade pain to change another's behaviour, but chooses targets that hurt the other side more than itself, and ideally bring some benefit at home.

Costs for Australia

The headline value of the affected trade ran into billions of dollars, yet the true losses were smaller. Barley could be redirected, though often as cheaper feed grade, to buyers in the Middle East and Asia, while other exporters filled the gap in China and freed up space elsewhere. Growers could also switch to wheat, pulses or oilseeds, and strong harvests and high cattle prices softened the blow. Wine and cotton had fewer options to change crops but were less dependent on China to begin with. Some barriers could be worked around through third countries or alternative processing plants.

None of that made the damage trivial for affected farms, firms and towns. Coercion also works politically: it invites industry to lobby for a softer line, gives domestic critics material, and sends a warning to other countries.

Costs and benefits for China

If the aim had been simply to cause maximum pain, wool would have been the obvious target, since about four-fifths of Australia's clip went to China. But Chinese worsted mills relied on Australian fine wool and had nowhere else to get it, so a ban would have hurt them badly. Barley was different. Imports had come to supply most of China's barley, nearly all from Australia, which clashed with Beijing's goals on food security and spreading import risk, and with support for poor barley-growing regions. Chinese brewers objected, but were overruled. Wine followed a similar pattern, with a domestic industry policy and complaints from local wineries preceding tariffs of up to around 200 per cent. Beef suspensions sat alongside a long effort by China to diversify its suppliers toward South America.

What it meant for policy

The episode showed that these were not one-off events but part of a broader pattern: a more assertive diplomatic style, an inward turn in Chinese economic planning, and growing use of protection for local producers. Decades of agricultural co-operation programmes did not prevent the measures, and better diplomacy alone was unlikely to reverse them.

Australia did not retaliate in kind. The government addressed technical complaints, prepared to challenge the barley tariffs under global trade rules, and held its policy positions with support from industry groups that largely kept commercial and foreign policy separate. Most farm bodies had already been urging diversification, and new trade and market access talks were under way with Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan and India. Replacing China would take time and carry costs, but the structural nature of the risk argued for spreading exposure early.

Why it matters for Australia

China was the largest single buyer of Australian farm produce, so the 2020 barriers tested how exposed regional industries were to political risk. The response shaped later efforts to diversify export markets and to rely on trade rules rather than retaliation.

First published in 2020 and rewritten for this edition. It describes events as they stood at the time and is general information only, not advice.

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