The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture

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The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture

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This paper seeks to describe and assess the geopolitical architecture of Indonesia as the largest archipelagic state in the world. It makes two main inter-related arguments. First, Indonesia’s geographical traits suggest that it could be both a source of weakness and vulnerability as much as it brings enormous potential for political, economic, and even military power. Second, the historical origins and conceptual foundations of ‘geopolitics’ as a policy theme suggest that Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture is based on three building blocks – the ‘strategic trinity’: geostrategy (the military and security dimensions), geoeconomics (the resource and economic dimensions), and geopolitics (the social and political dimensions). While these arguments are not novel in themselves, this paper represents among the first attempts to systematically analyse and assess Indonesia’s geographical traits and how they shape the country’s strategic thinking, foreign policy, and national security system. The paper will also consider how Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture could help explain the country’s resurgent interest in the Indian Ocean Region in recent years.

Keywords: archipelagic state; strategic trinity; geostrategy; geoeconomics; geopolitics

I. Introduction

This paper seeks to describe and assess the geopolitical architecture of Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia and the world’s largest archipelagic state. Geopolitical architecture is generally seen as the ways in which states access, manage and regulate the intersection of territories and flows, and, in so doing establish borders between inside/outside and domestic/international (Dodds 2007, p. 55). The long-established study of geopolitics, however, suggests that observers should not only focus on the geographical dimension of a state’s security and foreign policy (Spykman 1969, pp. 5–6), but also on the perceptions of the political and security elite regarding the nature of their environment, or their ‘political–geographical mental maps’ (Muir and Paddison 1981, p. 209). A geopolitical architecture, therefore, must be understood to be broader than just the relationship between spatial dimensions and politics. Instead, it needs to be seen within the historical development of a state’s strategic thinking regarding the social, economic, cultural, political and security dimensions of its geography.

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Assessing and understanding Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture is important for two reasons. First and foremost is Indonesia’s ‘strategic centrality’ within the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia is not only abundant with natural resources such as oil and gas, but the country is also located in the middle of the ‘cross-roads’ between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and between the Asian and Australian continents. It also controls four of the world’s seven major maritime chokepoints, including the Malacca Strait. This further suggests that the economic, political and military lifeline of the Asia-Pacific region and its major powers – the United States, India, Australia, China, Japan – depends on the stability, foreign policy and geopolitical thinking in Jakarta.

Secondly, while there are numerous studies on Indonesia’s strategic thinking, foreign policy and national security system (for example, Weinstein 1976; Sebastian 2006; Novotny 2010), these discussions rarely address or consider the country’s geographical traits as a significant explanatory variable. One exception was the work of Djalal (1996), written over a decade ago, regarding Indonesia’s geopolitical thinking and history in relation to its maritime territorial behaviour. This work, however, is not only in need of revision with new materials, but it is focused more on the maritime domain and less on the larger strategic picture of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture. Other scattered works on the country’s geopolitics have relatively been more of a policy snapshot rather than a systematic assessment (for example, Alfandi 2002; Anggoro 2006).

This paper makes two main interrelated arguments. First, Indonesia’s geographical traits as the largest archipelagic state present an enduring paradox and dilemma as they could be both a source of weakness and vulnerability as much as they could bring enormous political, economic, and even military potential. This argument confirms a long-held assumption that the geography of a state presents both opportunities and limitations for that state, and therefore shapes and affects its national security and foreign policy (for example, Sempa 2002). The present paper will further show how this enduring paradox of weakness and strength shapes the country’s force development, foreign policy, strategic thinking and even security operations and assessments.

Second, the history and evolution of Indonesia’s ‘geopolitics’ as a policy practice and theme (as opposed to a well-developed academic school of thought) suggests that the country’s geopolitical architecture is defined and built over what this paper calls the ‘strategic trinity’ – geostrategy (the military and security dimensions), geoeconomics (the resource and economic dimensions) and geopolitics (the social and political dimensions). While this argument is certainly not a novel one within the larger literature on geopolitics, it does represent among the first attempts to systematically spell out and assess the differing dimensions and implications of Indonesia’s geographical traits.

By way of outline, this paper will first describe Indonesia’s basic geographical traits as the largest archipelagic state in the world to understand the various complexities and implications relating to the country’s strategic thinking, foreign policy and national security system. The following section will discuss the historical origins and conceptual foundations of Indonesia’s ‘geopolitics’ as practical policy guidance for the country’s policy elite. Based on these two sections, the paper will then assess the strategic trinity of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture and detail how they impact on the country’s foreign policy and national security system. Prior to a
final conclusion, the penultimate section of the paper will also be devoted to analysing Indonesia’s growing interest in the Indian Ocean Region in recent years based on the previous sections.

2. Indonesia’s geographical traits

The Indonesian archipelago of 18,108 islands comprises 2.8 million square kilometres of water (92,877 sq. km of inland waters), 1,826,440 square kilometres of land, and if its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is factored in, the country’s area stretches to 7.9 million square kilometres (Cribb and Ford 2009, p. 1). However, unlike other archipelagic states, Indonesia is a complex of archipelagos and large islands with Java being the dominant one. The disparity between the islands in terms of population, political weight and economic development means that a convoluted centre–periphery tension marks the country’s history. This will be further elaborated in the following sections. For now, suffice it to say that Indonesia’s geographical fragmentation coupled with the underlying centre–periphery tension underline the country’s internal security problems and threats.

Indonesia also hosts four of the world’s seven major maritime choke points while sitting between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and between the Asian and Australian continents. As such, major powers have historically been drawn to and have taken considerable interest in the development of Indonesia as it could tip the regional balance of power. Its bountiful natural resources such as petroleum, tin, natural gas, nickel, timber, coal and copper further increases the country’s strategic value. However, as the ‘expressions of interest’ by the major powers are not always manifested in the most favourable terms for Jakarta, the country’s policymakers have from time to time feel a sense of insecurity and fear of exploitation, often giving urgency to control the country’s waterways and patrol the maritime domain.

In this regard, Indonesia’s predominant geographical trait as the largest archipelagic state with thousands of islands creates huge complications over maritime governance. Even after the 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and two Indonesian government regulations, Indonesia still has differing levels of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters within and outside its archipelagic baselines (Oegroseno 2009, p. 51). This layered jurisdiction poses considerable challenges for the country’s management of its maritime domain, especially since many of its maritime boundaries – with 10 countries, the most in the world – have yet to be finally negotiated and demarcated.

Thus, in essence, Indonesia’s geographical traits are characterised by: (1) a vast maritime domain; (2) the prevalence of internal security, political and economic problems on land; and (3) the persistence of major power rivalries in its regional environment due to its strategic location. Yet, as will be discussed below, the last trait of location has had the most significant imprint on the mental map of Indonesian policymakers (Djalal 1996, p. 101). Indeed, assertions regarding Indonesia’s historical journey, turbulent relations with the major powers, or regional leadership, are often attributed to the ‘cross-road location’ (known as posisi silang) between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and between the Asian and Australian continents.

Even the Indonesian term for ‘archipelago’ is Nusantara, a traditional Javanese expression that means ‘situated between the islands’ (Djalal 1996, p. 107). Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia’s first vice president and chief architect of its
independent and active foreign policy, further argued: ‘Nature has ordained that Indonesia, lying between two continents – the Asian mainland and Australia – and washed by the waters of two vast Oceans – the Indian and Pacific – must maintain intercourse with lands stretching in a great circle around it’ (Hatta 1953, p. 450). This argument is still alive today and continues to resonate within the foreign policy elite (Novotny 2010).

Indonesia’s geographical traits have two contradictory implications for its geopolitical architecture. On the one hand, the vast maritime domain could become a buffer surrounding the country and offering protection – and, if fully controlled, could form a unified political, geographic, economic, social and security entity. In theory, this should allow Indonesia to emerge as a major maritime power and regional leader. However, on the other hand, the convoluted centre–periphery relations between Jakarta and the outer islands as well as the social/religious/economic diversity of its people have led Indonesia’s policymakers to view geography as a source of vulnerability and weakness.

3. Historical origins and conceptual foundations

As a geopolitical entity, ‘Indonesia’ did not exist before the completion in the beginning of the twentieth century of a process of administrative and territorial consolidation by the Dutch colonial authority (Sebastian 2006, p. 53). Before then, the archipelago comprised separate kingdoms with a much more limited geographical and geopolitical space – many of which were ‘land-based’ or continental powers. Except for several major kingdoms such as Majapahit (1293–1527) that ruled large portions of the area, the entire Indonesian archipelago also never had a single long-lasting major dynasty that expanded its influence beyond the borders. These historical contexts had helped to sustain a ‘defensive land power’ strategic culture, especially after the Dutch colonised the territory over three centuries (Anggoro 2006, p. 72–73). This is also among the reasons why, despite the country’s maritime nature – as the following sections will show – Indonesia’s geopolitical thinking focuses on internal security threats.

That said, it is not generally known precisely when and how the study and concept of geopolitics first came to Indonesia. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the invasion of the Japanese during World War II and the training of several Indonesian officers in the Dutch military academy may have instilled the works of prominent geopolitical theorists in the minds of Indonesia’s founding fathers. During the early days of the country’s independence, for example, some leaders uttered geopolitical terms like ‘The Sphere of Greater East Asia’. One of them, Muhammad Yamin, explicitly used the term ‘geopolitics’ in August 1945 when presenting his ideas for a ‘Greater Indonesia’ incorporating the territory of the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya and North Borneo, Portuguese East Timor and the Dutch West New Guinea (Yamin 1970). General T.B. Simatupang, among the founding figures of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and an avid reader of Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart (Sebastian 2006, p. 62), was also well known for his fondness for the term ‘geopolitics’.

However, for all of this seemingly familiarity with the concept, ‘geopolitics’ as a distinct school of thought or theory was never systematically developed by Indonesian scholars and policymakers. Instead, ‘geopolitics’ developed as a practical
policy theme and political phrase with different specific interpretations from time to time. But the idea of ‘geopolitics’ as the country’s foreign and security policy foundation remains. As a political phrase, it was also often used in the speeches and writings of the elite. This suggests that the dominant view of geopolitics then was to treat the term as ‘practical themes’ (a set of underlying assumptions) rather than ‘academic theories’ (Djalal 1996, p. 101). This is also perhaps why Indonesia never had a geopolitical theorist or doyen like Mahan or MacKinder, or a distinct geopolitical school of thought.

As a matter of practical national policy guidance, the earliest foundation of modern Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture can be traced back to the period between 1956 and 1960. It was during this period that the foreign policy and security elite first started to systematically and seriously consider the country’s geography arising out of concerns over foreign maritime passages within the archipelago (Djalal 1996, p. 18). Indeed, before and after declaring independence, the founding fathers were apparently not urgently concerned with the country’s boundaries. Indeed, it was not until 1956 that the government established the Inter-Departmental Committee to systematically assess geopolitical issues pertaining to the country’s maritime and territorial boundaries. Specifically, it was tasked with reviewing the country’s 1939 Colonial Ordinance and preparing a draft on the Law on Indonesian Territorial Waters and Maritime Environment (Danusaputro 1980, pp. 131–134).

The 1939 Ordinance formulated by the Netherlands – then the only regulatory foundation of the country’s maritime and territorial boundary – stipulated that the country’s sovereignty extended three miles from the low-water mark (Siahaan and Suhendi 1989). This presented Jakarta with huge security challenges. Since distances exceeding six miles separate most of its islands or island groups, the three-mile belts could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket (Djalal 1996, p. 20). Consequently, there were numerous fragments of territorial waters – most of which consist of international waters or open seas – compartmentalising the islands. A Foreign Ministry publication notes that: ‘The presence of pockets of open sea amongst [the islands] posed a grave danger to the security and territorial integrity of Indonesia, since such a situation had given opportunities for external elements to imperil Indonesia by way of those high seas to support local political unrests’ (MOFA 1986, p. 10).

Aside from this problem, there were other factors that drove the formation and work of the Inter-Departmental Committee (Djalal 1996, p. 26–27), including the increasing rise and significance of smuggling in the archipelago, the growing unrest and rebellions in various regions, and the suspicion that there were ‘foreign maritime activities’ with hostile intent, especially with regard to Dutch Naval activities in West Irian. Given these conditions, a year into the Committee’s work, Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja issued a declaration in 1957 that would later be known as the Djuanda Declaration that shelved the 1939 ordinance:

The government declares that all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state . . . The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12-miles) is measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia. (Cited in Djalal 1996, p. 29)
This declaration forms Indonesia’s first explicit policy to unify the archipelago into a single entity and to ‘close off’ its open seas. It also shapes the country’s geopolitical architecture for decades by giving birth to what is now called the ‘Archipelago Doctrine’ or ‘Archipelagic State Concept’. Yet, two years were to pass before the Djuanda Declaration would finally be ratified by parliament. Partly because the elite had adopted a wait-and-see attitude with regard to the First UN Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) to test the doctrine’s conceptual credibility (Djalal 1996, p. 36), and partly because other maritime powers, especially the United States, Britain and Australia, expressed strong opposition. Indonesia would only later be successful in having the doctrine accepted into international law by the third UNCLOS (UNCLOS III) in 1982.

The Djuanda Declaration was nonetheless enacted as Act No. 4 of 1960, which formalised a new territorial structure by expanding Indonesia’s overall national territory by about 2.5 fold from 2.02 million square kilometres to 5.19 million square kilometres. More importantly, the new territorial configuration consisted of 196 straight baselines, forming a circumference surrounding the Indonesian islands which amounted to over 8000 nautical miles in length (Kusumaatmadja 1982, p. 22). Jakarta also issued the Act on Innocent Passage in 1962 as a corollary regulation that deals with navigational conduct and establishes operational criteria to determine the ‘innocent’ character of maritime passage within Indonesia’s waters.

However, the period of President Sukarno’s Old Order (1959 to 1965) never saw a serious attempt to take the Djuanda Declaration and two enacted laws further. Instead, President Sukarno was more interested in abstract political slogans than practical policy. Also, the military as among the key proponents of the Archipelagic Doctrine, was too plagued with inter-service rivalry and factionalism to keep the matter alive and well in the minds of the Cabinet. Finally, the legal uncertainty of the Archipelagic Doctrine under international law had also contributed to the lethargic attitude among domestic policymakers (Djalal 1996, p. 57). This trend would later be reversed under the New Order of President Suharto (from 1965 to 1998).

Under the New Order, the Djuanda Declaration and territorial maritime issues were revived and specifically formulated. Indeed, the new elite proceeded to expand the country’s maritime jurisdictions by claiming the continental shelf areas outside the archipelagic borders in 1969 and announced its Exclusive Economic Zones in 1981. Jakarta also spent enormous political and diplomatic capital to obtain maritime border treaties with neighbouring countries (totalling 12 with six countries by 1980) as well as fighting for the acknowledgement of the Archipelagic State concept in UNCLOS and other forums. But most importantly, the birth of the doctrine of ‘Archipelagic Outlook’ (Wawasan Nusantara) in 1966 marked the restructuring and revitalisation of Indonesia’s geopolitical thinking. It should also be noted that the rise of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) at the expense of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965, helped pave the way for the rise of the geopolitical orientation in the late 1960s.

In November 1966, a seminar organised by the Department of Defence and Security produced the Doctrine on National Defence and Security and the Doctrine of the Struggle of the Armed Forces. Both argued for the first time that Indonesia’s defence and security doctrine, in its practical sense, would be the Maritime Archipelagic Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara Bahari): ‘an outlook of the nation’s worldview, where the utilization and mastery of the sea is an absolute necessity to
enhance national prosperity and glory’ (Hardjosoenar 1981, p. 178). Although a revised version of the doctrine deleted the word ‘maritime’ from the title, it still represented an attempt by the new military–political elite to create a new conceptual framework for defence and foreign and security policy rooted in the country’s geographical character.

This development also had the effect of formalising the notion that geography is a ‘strategic’ arena where the ‘whole entity of land and water becomes a single strategic defence system’ (Kroef 1976, p. 482). As it began to take greater significance after ABRI’s endorsement, a revised version of the Archipelagic Outlook was submitted in 1972 to parliament and became part of the 5-year National Policy Guidelines. By 1973, the geopolitically-oriented outlook was thus elevated from a defence doctrine to a political doctrine (Djalal 1996, p. 66). The unintended consequence of this elevation, however, was the increasingly blurred geographical dimension of the doctrine as economic, social and political considerations started to feature more prominently.

Thus, the Archipelagic Outlook dominated the country’s geopolitical thinking during the New Order. Former Armed Forces Commander, M. Panggabean (1982), p. 34), even stated that the Archipelagic Outlook is ‘the geopolitics of Indonesia’. Others believed that the Outlook is ‘a geopolitical conception which is uniquely Indonesian’ (Soebroto, Sunardi and Wahyono 1983, p. 60). The Outlook in essence aimed to provide coherence to the country’s fragmented geography while linking land and sea to provide a metaphor unifying the disparate socio-economic-political groupings into a single unified entity (Lowry 1996). Over time, four main themes emerged out of this conception (Djalal 1996, p. 101): (1) an enduring concern over geographical location; (2) a suspicion toward extra-regional powers; (3) an aspiration for regional activism and leadership; and (4) a concern over national unity in the wake of fragmented geography. As the following sections will show, the interplay of these four main themes continues to resonate in the minds of the policymakers today.

To sum up, this section has shown how the country’s geopolitical architecture is largely defined as the ongoing effort to both address the country’s fragile and vulnerable state structure as well as the marshalling of national resources to defend the state as a unified geographical, political, social, economic, and security entity. The paper further submits that out of this conception three dominant themes or building blocks are particularly germane: geostrategy (the military and security dimensions), geoeconomics (the resource and economic dimensions) and geopolitics (the social and political dimensions).

4. Geostrategy: the military and security dimensions

As the previous section shows, geopolitical thinking under the New Order was elevated to new heights and sophistication – conceptually and politically. It was also during this period that geopolitics, especially through the Archipelagic Outlook, became the purview of the ‘strategic arena’. As such, the military–security dimensions form the first building block of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture. In this regard, the military first and foremost considers Indonesia’s crossroad location as a source of vulnerability. Former Armed Forces Commander, Benny Moerdani, noted: ‘The threat which endangers the sovereignty of the republic comes not only from the Northern area. Rather, danger would also come from all directions, be it
from the South, from the East, or from the West of the Nusantara Archipelago’ (cited in Djalal 1996, p. 109).

However, paradoxically, some also saw Indonesia’s location as a potential source of power and influence, provided that the country could exploit it, but this in turn depends on the military’s ability to effectively control the maritime waterways. As such, military theorists within the high command often argued for the critical need to develop a defence system that would allow ‘the complete control of the islands, and with the islands as strong points, establish the rule of the seas between and around them’ (Suryohadiprodjo 1969, p. 233). This line of thinking continues to guide the military’s doctrinal development until today (MoD 2010). Not least because it provides the much-needed rationale to increase defence spending and sustain military modernisation.

Yet, despite the inescapable conclusion that Indonesia’s maritime character and doctrinal foundation should have led defence planners to focus on building and sustaining a modernised, capable navy, the military (TNI) is paradoxically an army-dominated institution (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, p. 9). Both the Air Force and Navy have been historically charged with providing direct support to the Army. Consequently, and given the enduring nature of internal security threats throughout the country’s history (see Figure 1), the military as a whole and defence planners in particular continue to focus on a ‘land-based defence’ (Widjajanto 2010). Another by-product has been small budgets, ageing equipment, low number of personnel and a relatively low general standing for the Navy (Dupont 1996).

Defence-in-depth has therefore been the preferred strategy for the military to defend the archipelago. Strategically, according to former Armed Forces Commander, Benny Moerdani, it talks about the comprehensive and broader aspects of defence (ideological, socio-cultural, political) while recognising the importance of ‘regional resilience’ in Southeast Asia as a buffer for the country (Moerdani 1993, p. 57). In today’s parlance, this ‘layered defence’ is interpreted as a system where the TNI forms the core component of national defence, with the yet-to-be-formed Reserve and Supporting Components, forming the second and third layer, respectively (MoD 2008).

Figure 1. Indonesia’s enemy character (1945–2004).
Note: The figures provided on Indonesia’s internal security threats are taken from the character (based on the types of the enemy) of 249 military operations undertaken by the Armed Forces between 1945 and 2004.
Source: All figures are adapted from Widjajanto and Wardahani (2008).
Operationally, this would be translated into the division of the country’s geography into three defence zones: Zone 1 — Buffer Zone (outside of the Indonesia’s EEZ to enemy territory); Zone 2 — Primary Defence Zone (between Outer Territorial Lines and EEZ); Zone 3 — Resistance Zone (internal waters and all islands). Tactically, the Outer Islands will absorb the initial blow of an attack, as local resources are being mobilised to and reinforced by the available air and naval power. The Navy and Air Force will be in charge of first two, while the third zone will be further divided into ‘Strategic Compartments’ where the Army will play a decisive role in all-out guerrilla warfare.

Most recently, the Ministry of Defence is preparing to gradually modify this layered defence strategy to focus more on integrated tri-service operations in three to five Joint Regional Commands — though retaining the geographical zoning. Indeed, the two Defence White Papers (2003 and 2008), as well as Law No. 3 of 2002 on National Defence and Law No. 34 of 2004 on the TNI, made explicit mention of the country’s geographically-based defence strategy. In the 2009 Strategic Defence Review process that formally gave birth to the Minimum Essential Force concept, a new geostrategic thinking was further adopted: ‘Flash-point Defence’. This focuses Indonesia’s force structure development not just qualitatively and quantitatively to obtain the minimum capability to deal with the country’s actual threats (see Table 1), but also geographically by gradually positioning forces in the areas of potential conflict — most of which are part of the outer islands (MoD 2010).

Scholars have argued that this geographically-informed ‘layered defence’ is based on the traditional Javanese concept of Mandala (Anderson 1990, pp. 43–47). In its original Sanskrit term, ‘Mandala’ refers to ‘circle’ or ‘completion’, representing a microcosm of the universe. The geometric circle of Mandala was designed to draw attention to its centre, where power lies — defined in Javanese thinking as the Island of Java itself. As far as the nexus of national security and foreign policy is concerned, its logic suggests that the centre’s power diminishes towards the state’s periphery. Hence, the closer the neighbouring country is, the more it poses a threat to Java. Studies have later confirmed that this Mandala logic also informs the thinking behind the country’s foreign policy and national security system (Lowry 1996; Sebastian and Lanti 2010). In this regard, Indonesia’s geostrategic outlook is represented as a series of concentric circles emanating from Jakarta. The first circle embraces the entire state as defined by the outer limits of its EEZ, the second encompasses the remainder of Southeast Asia and Australia, while the third embraces the remainder of the world.

The above assessment and projection of Indonesia’s threats also suggests, however, that Jakarta, while factoring in geographical features, still maintains the ‘enduring linkage between external and internal threats’ (Lowry 1996, p. 5). Though the wave of military reform after Suharto’s downfall had wanted to end the internal security thinking of the military, the fact that Indonesia’s strategic environment is increasingly exhibiting signs of a nexus between traditional and non-traditional security challenges makes it very difficult to abandon the linkage altogether.

This complexity is perhaps best exemplified by the problems surrounding Indonesia’s maritime security. The weakening of maritime surveillance after Suharto’s fall has led to an increase in piracy incidents for the past decade, although the numbers have been dropping recently (see Figure 2). The drop can be explained by a confluence of factors, including the end of the Acehnese rebellion in 2005, more
extensive regional and national counter-piracy efforts, tighter government control and the increase in joint patrols and surveillance since 2004, including a coordinated joint surface patrol with Malaysia and Singapore and airborne surveillance under the ‘Eyes in the Sky’ scheme (Bradford 2008, p. 482).

Table 1. Indonesia’s threat overview and projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual threats</th>
<th>Potential threats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Global warming</td>
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<td>Separatism</td>
<td>Violations of sea lanes of communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border disputes and outer island</td>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
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<td>managements</td>
<td>Pandemics</td>
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<td>Natural disasters</td>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
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<td>Illegal smuggling</td>
<td>Cyber crime</td>
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<td>Horizontal conflicts</td>
<td>Foreign aggression</td>
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<td>Energy scarcity</td>
<td>Food and water crisis</td>
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Indonesia’s threat scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foreign military power involved in local separatist movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Use of force in border conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign pressure combined with military presence in securing access of Indonesia’s energy source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Foreign military presence in Indonesia’s sea lanes of communication to secure economic routes</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Foreign military presence to fight terrorists within Indonesia</td>
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Flash point zones

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<th>Flash point zones</th>
<th>Possible scenarios</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Riau and Riau Islands</td>
<td>Scenario 2, 3, and 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Borneo (Kalimantan)</td>
<td>Scenario 2 and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Borneo (Kalimantan)</td>
<td>Scenario 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Sulawesi</td>
<td>Scenario 2 and 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-eastern Sulawesi</td>
<td>Scenario 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lombok</td>
<td>Scenario 4</td>
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<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>Scenario 2 and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Moluccas</td>
<td>Scenario 1, 3, and 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua and Western Papua</td>
<td>Scenario 1, 2, and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Malacca Straits</td>
<td>Scenario 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Lanes of Communications</td>
<td>Scenario 5 along with illegal activities and environmental degradation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted and modified from MoD (2010).
Counter-piracy measures have also included efforts to improve living standards in coastal districts along the Malacca Strait (Rokan Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak, Palawan, Indragiri Ilir, Karimun) as well as other regions near major sea lanes, with the hope that improved economic conditions will diminish piracy (Dillon 2000; Eklof 2006; Ho 2006). However, geographically, there are several regional hotspots in Indonesia where maritime piracy still poses significant challenges. These are also areas where maritime boundaries have not been fully demarcated and maritime enforcement is problematic: parts of the Malacca Strait, Riau Archipelago, southern part of South China Sea, and the tri-border area in the Sulu and Sulawesi seas (Bateman 2009, p. 127).

This highlights the reality that maritime security exemplifies the complexity of on both non-traditional socio-economic factors and traditional unfinished maritime boundaries. Another related example is the challenge of territorial incursions by illegal fishers or Indonesia’s neighbouring countries. There are some 3180 foreign fishing vessels thought to be operating illegally in Indonesian waters each year (Sumaryono 2009, p. 138). Meanwhile, Malaysia has been singled out as among the most frequent violators of Indonesia’s maritime territory (see Table 2). This problem could also be attributed to the country’s fragmented archipelagic nature, unfinished maritime boundaries, as well as its underdeveloped navy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Warships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Marine Police vessels</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Marine Police vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Naval aircrafts</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Naval aircrafts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Warships</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Warships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Naval aircrafts</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Naval aircrafts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures adapted and modified from Indonesian Navy (2010).
5. Geoeconomics: the economic and resource dimensions

In the first decade of the country’s independence, Indonesia’s economy was almost exclusively sustained by the production of food and crops on land. Fisheries barely contributed to the country’s gross national product (GNP), while offshore mining was at an almost zero level. Inter-island trade was sluggish, as was inter-island communication and transportation. As economic development grew rapidly, however, alongside the growing prominence of Indonesia’s maritime-based geopolitical thinking in the past four decades, the importance of the sea also grew. This can be especially seen in regard to the economic and resources dimensions – the second building block of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture.

In terms of marine resources, while fisheries only account for about 2.2% of Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP), the sector employs roughly 3 million direct full-time jobs in 2002 (Patlis 2007, p. 202). It has also been increasingly generating foreign exchange revenue. From a mere US$368,000 in 1965 in export value to over US$131 million in the 1970s. A wide range of marine life is harvested today for consumption – from fish and shrimps to turtles and shellfish (Williams 2007, pp. 40–42). Indeed, the Indonesian seas are today the world’s fourth largest producer of fish, with an annual catch of between 3.7 and 7.7 million tonnes (Cribb and Ford 2009, p. 9). The sea has also increasingly become an important source of minerals (seabed), including polymetallic nodules as well as hydrothermal sulphides containing gold, silver, copper, lead and zinc (from the Sulawesi Sea north of Manado) (Cribb and Ford 2009, p. 10).

Offshore oil and gas drilling provides another important piece of Indonesia’s geoeconomics. While initially unaware of the sea’s potentials, by the time Jakarta was ready to seriously consider exploiting the seabed in the late 1960s that make up 70% of its territory, offshore drilling was an established skill (Djalal 1996). Offshore oil extraction then began in 1971 with Arco’s opening of the Cinta and Arjuna fields in West Java which continues to be the richest oil region in the country (Cribb and Ford 2009, p. 10). Offshore oil and gas extraction also spread to the eastern Java Sea and the seas around the Natuna Islands. Recently, both shallow and deep-sea oil fields have been discovered in the Makassar Stair (Barnes 1995, p. 79). By the 2000s, as production rose, oil and gas have increasingly become a huge source of revenue (see Figure 3).

Overall, Indonesia held proven oil reserves of 3.75 billion barrels (bbl) at the end of 2008 and a proven natural gas reserves of 3185 billion cubic metres (bcm) (BMI

![Figure 3. State revenue from oil and gas (billion US$).](source: Adapted from Dam (2010, pp. 127–128).)
2009, p. 34). It is worth noting that the single largest producer of oil in Indonesia is not the state-owned Pertamina, but the multinational Chevron, followed by British Petroleum (BP), ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Total (Sovacool 2010, p. 255). In the gas fields, Pertamina only controls 21% of natural gas production, but six international companies dominate the industry: Total, ExxonMobil, Vico, ConocoPhillips, BP and Chevron (USEIA 2010). This high degree of energy insecurity suggests yet again another paradox of Indonesia’s geography in the minds of policymakers: the country may be rich in resources, but it is highly dependent on foreign companies to exploit them.

That being said, the growing importance of Indonesia’s offshore oil and gas resources has led the New Order government to organise Indonesia’s maritime territory into an extensive network of contract areas, or ‘blocks’, over which Jakarta assigns oil companies to explore and exploit hydrocarbons with certain production-sharing arrangements (Djalal 1996, p. 81). The basic tenets and architecture of this geoeconomic foundation of Indonesia’s oil and gas sector still stands today.9 Indeed, the offshore portion of gas and oil (compared to onshore ones) has grown at an annual production rate of around 60% in the 1970s and 1980s (Djalal 1996, p. 83). These blocks have covered virtually all of the waters on the western and central part of the Archipelago, and recently, the discovery and development of the eastern part is starting to materialise. This may explain why the Navy’s Western Fleet was the first to be modernised and developed, while the Eastern Fleet was only recently developed.

Aside from these resources, the sea has also been the primary avenue of transport and communication, both between the islands within the country as well as between Indonesia and the outside world. There are more than 750,000 dockings per year at Indonesian ports loading more than 300 million tonnes of cargo, and about 14 million people travel by its seas annually (Cribb and Ford 2009, p. 8). There are also around 1700 ports (including 25 main strategic ports), through which about 90% of Indonesia’s external trade is transported (Ray 2009, pp. 95–96). All in all, the total value of trade passing through Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes amounts to US$300 trillion in the Malacca Strait, US$40 trillion in the Lombok Strait, and US$5 trillion in the Sunda Strait (Sumaryono 2009, p. 134).

However, in yet another sign of the paradoxical nature of Indonesia’s geoeconomics, the fact that there are overlapping agencies overseeing marine management and law enforcement—not to mention an under-developed navy—means that the sea is also a source of security threats and vulnerabilities.10 These include, inter alia, illegal immigrants, either traversing the waters on their way to Australia, or ending up staying (Hunter 2006), Indonesians illegally crossing into neighbouring countries (Hugo 1993), illicit small arms and light weapons and drugs trafficking (ICG 2010; Muna n.d.), and the more high-profile issue of maritime piracy (Bateman 2009). Illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, however, has begun to feature more prominently in recent years. Despite restrictive measures, huge volumes of fish, shellfish and other marine life are caught illegally, costing the country roughly between $5 billion and $8 billion annually, according to one local estimate (Media Indonesia 2010).

Aside from these paradoxes, it is also worth noting that the doctrine of the Archipelagic Outlook formulated by the New Order explicitly address the issues of resources by claiming that the archipelagic territory constitutes a single ‘economic
entity’, in a sense that ‘the riches of the territory of the archipelago, potentially as well as effectively, are the collective asset and property of the Nation’ (cited from Djalal 1996, p. 91). This argument more than anything highlights the economic and resource dimension of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture.

6. Geopolitics: the social and political dimensions

The third building block of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture, the social and political dimensions, can be thought of comprising two different levels: internal and external. Internally, it speaks to the country’s history of separatism and internal unrest as well as its highly diverse socio-ethnic-religious composition. Indonesia has more than 250 million people divided into over 300 ethnic groups with their own language, history and socio-cultural systems, as well as five major religions The problem is not only a matter of sheer diversity. However, a dozen or more of the non-Javanese ethnic groups are large enough to credibly claim a separate national status (Cribb and Ford 2009, p. 6), making separatism a believable and even feasible option, especially given the geographic fragmentation of the country.

Furthermore, the uneven level of economic development between Jakarta and the regions (and in some cases, exploitation by the former), between the geographically dispersed major ethnic groups have created convoluted centre–periphery relations filled with underlying tensions. The advent of political and financial decentralisation in 2001 has reduced some of these tensions (Erb et al. 2005). However, the ineffective governance capacity of many of these newly-formed local administrations continues to exacerbate problems of corruption, poverty, unemployment and a lack of economic development in the regions and outer islands. Even the establishment of direct local elections for district chiefs, mayors and governors through popular voting has not seemed to make a crucial difference in alleviating the problems surrounding good local governance (Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009).

This has two immediate implications for Indonesia’s national security system and geopolitical architecture. First, as discussed in the previous section regarding geostrategy, internal security threats – from separatism to terrorism and subversions – continue to dominate the country’s strategic environment; and, by implication, the nature of strategic thinking among policymakers. As such, many of the responses provided by the state centres on either social-economic solutions of development (as can been seen in regard to maritime piracy, for instance), or repressive actions taken by the security forces (as can be seen in Aceh or Papua). Second, the dispersion of the different socio-ethnic-religious groups across the archipelago provides a rationale to spread out the Army’s Territorial Command structure (paralleling and covering administrative provinces, districts, and villages) as a mechanism to ensure that internal security threats – actual or potential – can be either nipped in the bud, or quelled as soon as possible. The advent of decentralisation political and financially empowering the regions further encourages this line of thinking (Laksmana 2010).

Yet, paradoxically again, the geographical separation among the major ethnic groups is what perhaps makes the country function as a ‘unitary state’ by placing some distance and by avoiding socio-cultural collisions on a regular basis. It has even been argued that Suharto’s New Order promoted and exploited the myth of a maritime way of life to create a sense of identity among these disparate groups as it sidesteps the problems they might have on land (Acciaoli 2001). Once again, this
speaks of the dual dimension of the country’s geographical traits with regard to the social-political dimensions.

Indonesia’s strategic thinking in this matter is further reflected and developed within the doctrine of National Resilience, which is also a by-product of Suharto’s Archipelagic Outlook. This doctrine asserts that national security does not depend on external alliances, but rather on the strengthening of internal ‘resilience’ on all aspects of national life: economic, political, military and socio-cultural. In essence, national resilience seeks to strengthen the country’s domestic political conditions to achieve stability and by implication, fend off any future or potential threats facing the country. National resilience thus complements the Archipelagic Outlook by envisioning a unified state – politically, economically, social-culturally, militarily and territorially. A related concept is what is known as ‘regional resilience’ – the sum of the national resilience of the respective regional countries, enabling them to settle jointly their common problems and look after their future well-being together – which was promoted and adapted into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) norms and practices (Tarling 2006, p. 138).

This relates to the second level of the social and political dimensions: external –or more specifically, its foreign policy. This speaks about the country’s sense of regional entitlement as the leader in Southeast Asia as well as the sense of insecurity and suspicion vis-à-vis extra-regional major powers. This sense of insecurity is best exemplified by the strong belief among Indonesia’s policymakers that the future of the country will increasingly depend on its ability to manoeuvre between the United States and China (Novotny 2010). The sense of suspicion is partly attributed to the strong feelings of nationalism and anti-colonialism, developed as a result of the bitter experiences with foreign powers throughout its history. The fact that each of the major powers, China, Britain, Japan, Netherlands, Soviet Union and United States, feature prominently and has at one time or another been engaged in ‘hostile acts’ against the country has left an enduring imprint within the minds of the policymakers.11

Thus, subsequent governments, from Sukarno’s Old Order to the present administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have never been fully comfortable with the involvement of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia. Yet, some within the foreign policy elite believe that given China’s rise, the presence of the United States is a tolerable option. This argument is based on the geopolitical awareness that the United States is ‘further away’ and therefore poses less of a serious threat than regional powerhouses closer to Indonesia (Novotny 2010, p. 322). Policymakers also acknowledge that given Indonesia’s strategic position, balancing extra-regional powers may be inevitable. This is why the foreign policy elite has always preferred to embrace an inclusive foreign policy: ‘establishing and maintaining at least workable relations with as many states as possible’, and striving for ‘the maintenance of a balance of power among all these states’ to create a safe space for manoeuvring (Novotny 2010, p. 302).

This helps explain Indonesia’s support and various initiatives through ASEAN to ensure that the region would be free from external intervention. This includes the creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1997. These arrangements may well ‘reflect a very strong belief in the balance of power within a multilateral...
arrangement’ (Novotny 2010, p. 303). Today, this balancing act falls under what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls ‘dynamic equilibrium’. One high-ranking official argued in January 2011 that one of the three key priorities of Indonesia as ASEAN Chair this year is to ‘ensure that the regional architecture and dynamics remain favourable to the creation of a dynamic equilibrium where ASEAN can and will play a central role’ (Oratmangun 2011).

7. Implications: from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean?

Indonesia’s Minister for Marine Affairs and Fisheries recently remarked: ‘The government believes that the Atlantic Ocean is the past, the Pacific Ocean is today, and the Indian Ocean is the future’ (cited in Adamrah 2011). Furthermore, the minister added that the government would soon release books on Indian Ocean economic policies and governance that would describe how the country views the ocean for food security in the future. Indonesia was also said to be working closely with India in any cooperative endeavours in the Indian Ocean Region. This development signals a quiet but significant shift in the country’s geopolitical orientation and focus.

For more than 60 years, as mentioned in the previous sections, Indonesia’s foreign policy and security elite has focused on the country’s strategic crossroads location. However, what they primarily had in mind were either the highly-prized Malacca Straits controlling the region’s economic, energy and military lifeline, or the contentious South China Sea that draws in regional powerhouse China into Indonesia’s front yard in disputes over potential energy sources and strategic waterways with the country’s closest neighbours (Suryadinata and Dinuth 2001). Surprisingly, the Indian Ocean, and relations with India as the biggest power in that region, has not featured prominently in the country’s strategic thinking.

In the past, Indonesia did pay close attention to the Indian Ocean Region, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. But this was largely related to the strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean that had the potential to spill over into Southeast Asia. President Suharto’s former adviser, Ali Moertopo (1977), p. 214), wrote: ‘The growing superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean is deplored by Indonesia . . . [and it] fears that such a rivalry could not only lead to an armed confrontation, but also generate undesirable pressures and demands on riparian and hinterland nations’. However, as soon as the Cold War ended, the Indian Ocean Region seems to have vanished from the minds of policymakers, especially given Indonesia’s closer personal history with India during the 1950s and the generally positive tone of the overall relations. This is perhaps among the reasons why India’s recent rise is viewed positively (Novotny 2010, p. 226).

While today’s strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region is changing, as suggested by the quote earlier in this section, the preceding analysis on Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture can help provide a better structured assessment of why the Indian Ocean is starting to feature more prominently in Indonesia’s strategic thinking. First of all, in terms of the security and strategic dimension, three factors are increasingly prominently for Jakarta in relation to the Indian Ocean Region: (1) Islamic radicalism and terrorism; (2) maritime security; and (3) great power politics.

Studies have shown that the recent development of terrorism and Islamic radicalism in Indonesia can be traced to groups in Central and South Asia (for
example, Gunaratna 2002; ICG 2003). Some of these groups were rumoured to have ‘slipped into’ the country’s porous borders in the Indian Ocean Region. The same porous borders on the northern tip of Sumatera are also as among the entry points for many illegal immigrants traversing Indonesian waters. Meanwhile, as piracy increases along with the strategic centrality of the Malacca Straits, maritime security in the Indian Ocean is also increasingly becoming a common strategic ground for Indonesia and India.

Also, the relative decline of Russia and the United States, and the rise of China and India amidst the growing complexity of maritime territorial disputes, energy insecurity and economic development, highlight the possible return of great power politics. With the United States, China and Japan competing over the control and stability in Indonesia’s eastern flank (the Pacific Ocean), the role of the Indian Navy as the strongest power in the Indian Ocean is increasingly critical to ensure a balanced order and stability in Indonesia’s western flank. This is among the key reasons behind the signing of the Strategic Partnership between India and Indonesia in 2005.

Second, in terms of the economic and resource dimension, China and India’s rise as economic powerhouses amidst Japan’s relative decline is further giving weight to the geoeconomic shift in the region with domestic economic ramifications for Jakarta. For instance, as India’s economy surges, it is increasingly looking towards Indonesian coal and palm oil, and is likely to surpass Japan as the biggest buyer of Indonesian coal. The Indonesian Coal Mining Association stated that India’s coal imports from Indonesia were likely to rise to 70 million metric tons by 2012, up from 40 million tons in 2010 (Jakarta Globe 2010). In a recent visit to New Delhi in January 2011, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono inked a memorandum of understanding worth US$15.1 billion and set an ambitious target of doubling trade over the next five years in the areas of mining, infrastructure development, gas and petroleum. This highlights the economic and resource dimensions of Indonesia’s resurgent interest in the Indian Ocean Region.

Finally, in terms of the social and political dimension, Indonesia’s interest in the Indian Ocean Region has more to do with foreign policy issues and the stability of its western flank than with the influence of India in domestic political affairs. For one thing, India never had a history of intervening directly in Indonesia’s internal affairs – unlike China and the United States – nor has it ever caused heightened political economic tensions – unlike Japan. For another, as India grows to be a regional powerhouse, Indonesia has a stake in its success in the global stage such as the G-20 and UN Security Council. This is because of two basic reasons. First, India and Indonesia, as the two biggest democracies in the region, are natural allies and both have plenty to offer to each other. Second, at the very least, if India can be successful on the world stage, it would provide assurances that perhaps Indonesia can follow.

8. Summary and conclusion
The preceding analysis has highlighted the evolution and origins of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture. It has also described and analysed three fundamental building blocks of that architecture: geostrategy (the military and security dimensions), geoeconomics (the resource and economic dimensions) and geopolitical (the social and political dimensions). The paper has also detailed how these three building
blocks influence Indonesia’s strategic thinking, foreign policy and national security system. The analysis also highlights the paradoxical nature of Indonesia’s geography as both a source weakness or vulnerability and a source of potential power. Finally, the paper has shown why and how the Indian Ocean Region is increasingly becoming a significant focus of the country’s strategic thinking and foreign policy focus.

While this paper does not claim is that these arguments are novel in themselves, they do nonetheless represent among the earliest attempts to systematically analyse and assess the country’s geopolitical thinking and – to place it within the bigger picture – how it shapes strategic thinking, foreign policy and the national security system. Certainly, further research is needed to process and trace the development of Indonesia’s strategic thinking. For example, whether and how the thoughts of ancient scholars and statesmen originating from the Archipelago still resonates within the policymakers today, or whether the thoughts of Western thinkers such as Mahan, MacKinder, Clausewitz and others are more influential. More research should also be conducted on how the foreign and security elite consider multilateralism as an ‘extension’ of geopolitical strategic thinking.

That said, given the importance that Indonesia will play this year as the Chair of ASEAN, its role within the G-20, and other regional and global forums, understanding the geopolitical focus and thinking of the country remains a worthy exercise. Furthermore, because geography as a determinant of foreign policy and national security system is permanent, understanding Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture could form the initial basis of any assessment – and in some cases, policy predictions – of the country’s future trajectory in the future. As a final word of caution, however, while this paper has arguably provided the initial skeleton and sketch of Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture, how and under what conditions that structure will be ‘filled’ to take the country forward would depend on the political will of the existing government.

Notes
1. These leaders were from the Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia (PPKI). Some of their writings and speeches can be found in Feith and Castle (1970)
2. In preparing for the 17 August 1945 Declaration of Independence, the founding fathers did not seriously consider the issues surrounding the future country’s territorial border. And between 1949 and 1950, none of the decrees and government regulations issued was maritime or sea-related. For details surrounding this period, see Jones (1964), Penders (1979), and Djalal (1996)
3. While the level of Dutch forces could be seen as relatively low, General Nasution, then head of the Army, believed that the presence of open seas within Indonesia’s territory could allow Holland to send in more military assets, and eventually ‘attack our air base in Bandung, Naval base in Surabaya, and our capital’ (cited in Pauker 1963, p. 287). The Cabinet also had strong suspicions that the United States has been complicit in or supporting the country’s regional rebellions (Kahin and Kahin 1997)
4. Throughout this paper, the term ‘Archipelagic Outlook’, ‘Archipelagic Doctrine’, ‘Archipelagic State Concept’ and ‘Archipelagic Concept’ refers to the same fundamental outlook or thinking that considers Indonesia as a unified geographical (maritime and land), political, security, economic, and social entity. Specific policy expressions of this concept will be further noted throughout the paper.
5. Some of the historical details of Indonesia’s journey throughout UNCLOS to fight for the Archipelagic Doctrine can be found in Butcher (2009).
6. The criteria are narrowly defined as ‘navigations with peaceful purposes through the territorial sea and internal waters: (1) from the high sea to Indonesian ports, and vice versa, (2) from on high sea to another high sea’. It also necessitates military vessels and non-commercial government ships to give prior notification to the naval chief before entering Indonesian waters. See Djalal (1996, p. 52–53)

7. The PKI was decimated and its follower arrested or killed after they were allegedly orchestrating an attempted coup. For the details surrounding the coup, the destruction of the PKI, and the subsequent rise of the Armed Forces to dominate Indonesia’s political system, see Crouch (1988), and Roosa (2006).

8. The Indonesian Armed Forces or ABRI would later change its name to Indonesian National Defence Forces or TNI in 1999 following the separation of the National Police from the institution.

9. While many of these contracts were awarded in the late 1960s, given the long-term value of the arrangements, it was only recently in the past 10 years or so that the government is renegotiating some of them with major oil companies. This is why some if not most of these blocks still stand.


11. The Japanese invaded and occupied it during World War II; the Dutch colonised it for over three centuries and continued to briefly control West Guinea; the British assisted Holland’s attempt to re-colonise it after Japan’s defeat; the Soviets were seen to play a role in the abortive 1948 communist revolt; the Americans were supporting regional rebels in Sumatera and Celebes; and the Chinese was seen to be behind the 1965 alleged coup. Details of these bitter encounters between Indonesia and the major powers can be seen in Kahin and Kahin (1997), Mortimer (1976), and McMillan (2005)

12. Numerous policy papers and documents produced in the past ten years by the Ministry of Defence, Military Headquarters, and the National Resilience Institute, which the author studied, all cited the thoughts and works of Clausewitz, Mahan, MacKinder, Spykman, and other Western thinkers. The Indonesian Navy even specifically cited two academic works by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School as the basis to formulate their doctrine.

References


Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and Indonesian Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, pp. 91–111.